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COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL UNDER
THE SENATE AND HOUSE
PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
LEO M. ROMERO*
In 1980 the judiciary committees of the Senate1 and the House of
Representatives2 reported bills revising the federal criminal code. Al-
though neither of these bills was enacted by the Ninety-Sixth Congress,
they represent the culmination of efforts, over a period of a decade, to
revise and reform the federal criminal laws in a comprehensive code.
The genesis of these efforts began with the Brown Commission Re-
port in 1970. 3 Following the recommendations of the Brown Commis-
sion, a number of bills were introduced in each Congress since 1973 with
the purpose of recodifying and reforming the federal criminal law and
procedure. Each of the bills has included provisions to deal with offend-
ers in the criminal system who suffer from some mental disability. 4 The
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. The author wishes to acknowledge the
valuable assistance of his research assistant, Mr. Kerry Kiernan, and wishes to express appre-
ciation to his colleagues, Professor Luis G. Stelzner and Professor Joseph Goldberg, for their
helpful comments.
1 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as S. 1722]. The Senate bill was
introduced on Sept. 7, 1979, and was entitled the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill, with revisions, on Jan. 17, 1980. Com-
mentary on this revised text of the bill is contained in S. REP. No. 96-553, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980).
2 H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 6915]. The House bill
was introduced on Mar. 25, 1980, and was entitled the Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980.
The House Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill, with revisions, on Sept. 25, 1980.
Commentary on this revised text is contained in H.R. REP. No. 96-1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
3 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, STUDY
DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970).
4 See H.R. 13959, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 21501-08 (1978); S. 1437, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
§§ 3611-16 (1977); H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3611-17 (1977); H.R. 2311, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. §§ 3611-14 (1977); S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3611-17 (1975); S. 1400, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. §§ 4221-25 (1973), reprinted in Hearing on S / andS 1400 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the ,enate Comm. on the Judiciag,, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5139-44 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearing]; S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3-1 lC1-3-1 1C8 (1973), reprinted
in 1973 Hean)g, supra, at 4400-07. None of these bills were enacted.
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latest of the bills, Senate Bill 1722 (S. 1722)5 and House Resolution 6915
(H.R. 6915),6 in the evolution of a new federal criminal code provide the
most comprehensive procedures for such offenders.
This article will analyze and compare the provisions of both the
Senate and House bills concerning the problem of the competency of a
criminal defendant to stand trial. It will examine and evaluate the pro-
cedures for the determination of mental competency to stand trial and
the procedures for the disposition of the incompetent defendant. Other
related provisions in the bills, 7 to the extent that they do not bear on the
competency issue, are beyond the scope of this article. Finally, this arti-
cle, in comparing the competency provisions in each bill, will show that
the House bill is superior to the Senate version in many respects and
thus should serve as the model for the next Congress in its efforts to
revise the competency to stand trial provisions in the federal law.
INTRODUCTION
The adversary nature of the American criminal justice system re-
quires that defendants in criminal cases be able to participate meaning-
fully in their defense. In order to participate meaningfully in their
defense, defendants must be able to understand the nature of the
charges against them and to assist their lawyer in preparing a defense.
If a defendant lacks the ability to participate in his defense in this sense,
he lacks the competency or fitness to stand trial.8 The conviction of a
defendant who is incompetent to stand trial is a denial of due process
guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
5 S. 1722, supra note 1, §§ 3611-17.
6 H.R. 6915, sapra note 2, §§ 6121-29.
7 Unrelated to this article is § 6128 in H.R. 6915 concerning prisoner transfers to mental
institutions. In S. 1722, the unrelated provisions include: § 3612, Determination of the Exist-
ence of Insanity at the Time of the Offense, § 3613, Hospitalization of a Person Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity; § 3614, Hospitalization of a Convicted Person Suffering From Mental
Disease or Defect; § 3615, Hospitalization of an Imprisoned Person Suffering From Mental
Disease or Defect; and § 3616, Hospitalization of a Person Due for Release but Suffering
From Mental Disease or Defect (to the extent that § 3616 considers the disposition of prison-
ers whose sentences are about to expire).
8 See generalo B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 98-108 (1978);
H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE, 428-74 (1954); Eizenstat,
Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 379 (1969); Pizzi, Competency to Stand
Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (1977);
Silten & Tullis, Mental Competenc in Criminal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 1053 (1977); Note,
Competence to Plead and the Retarded Defendant: United States v. Masthers, 539 F2d 721 (D. C Cir.
1976), 9 CONN. L. REV. 176 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Competence to Plead]; Note, Incompetenc
to Stand Trial, 81 HAv. L. REv. 454 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Incompeteny]; Mental Health
Law Project, Incompetence to Stand Trial on Criminal Charges, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 617
(1978).
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States Constitution.9 To convict an incompetent defendant offends due
process in the sense that it is fundamentally unfair to convict a person
who, in effect, is absent from the proceedings.' 0 In addition, there is
concern about the accuracy of the factual determination of guilt where
one side in the adversary system cannot participate." Relevant evi-
dence on the issue of guilt or innocence is possessed by the defendant,
and the availability of this evidence is often lost when the defendant is
unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or un-
able to assist his counsel in his defense.
The present federal law dealing with the issue of competency is set
forth in chapter 313 of title 18 of the United States Code. 12 This chap-
ter contains provisions concerning the procedure for the determination
of competency prior to trial' 3 and the procedure for determining, after
conviction, whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. 14 In
addition, the present federal statute authorizes indeterminate commit-
ment of an incompetent defendant. 15
The provisions in title 18 are not detailed. In addition, federal
court decisions have added a substantial overlay of caselaw with respect
to both the procedure for a competency determination and to the com-
mitment of an incompetent defendant. 16
9 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966).
10 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 170-72, where the Court considered this argument
but found it unnecessary to base the due process violation on the in absentia ground. Instead,
the Court said that competency is fundamental to a fair trial in an adversary system ofjustice.
Id. at 171-72.
11 See A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 203-04 (1975);
Incompetenc,, supra note 8, at 457.
12 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48 (1976).
13 Id. § 4244.
14 Id. § 4245.
15 Id. §§ 4246-48.
16 See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d
972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Eskridge v. United States, 443 F.2d 440
(10th Cir. 19 7 1);Inre Harmon, 425 F.2d 916 (lst Cir. 1970); Nelms v. United States, 318 F.2d
150 (4th Cir. 1963) (per curiam). Injackson, the Court held that any defendant committed to
an institution solely on account of his incapacity to stand trial could not be held more than a
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there was a substantial probability
that he would attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. 406 U.S. at 738. The current
statutory provisions contain no such limitation. The DiCilio court held that the government
had the burden in the competency hearing of proving competency by a preponderance of the
evidence. 538 F.2d at 988. Currently, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 contains only the provision that the
judge shall make a finding as to competency based on the evidence. In Eskrge, the court
stated that the competency hearing should be adversarial in nature, and the defendant given
the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence of his own. 443 F.2d at 442.
18 U.S.C. § 4244 does not specifically provide this opportunity. The Harmon court further
specified that any psychiatric report with respect to the defendant should be made available
to the defendant prior to the competency hearing as a basis for the examination of the psychi-
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Both S. 172217 and H.R. 691518 include subchapters on compe-
tency concerning both the determination of competency and the incom-
petency commitment. Both bills are much more specific than title 18 of
the United States Code and reflect major court decisions on the subject.
This article will first examine the provisions of each bill that per-
tain to the determination of competency. It will compare those provi-
sions with the corresponding sections of title 18. The article will then
analyze the provisions of each bill concerning the disposition of the in-
competent defendant and compare them with the present federal law.
I. DETERMINATION OF MENTAL COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
A. RAISING THE COMPETENCY ISSUE
Who May Raise the Competenc Issue?
Both S. 1722 and H.R. 6915, like U.S.C. § 4244, provide that the
defendant, the attorney for the government, or the court may raise the
question of the defendant's mental competency to stand trial. 19 The de-
fense counsel and the prosecutor must initiate the inquiry by a motion
for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant.
The court may raise the issue on its own motion.20
atrist at the hearing. 425 F.2d at 918. Again, there is no such specific requirement in 18
U.S.C. § 4244. In regard to incompetency not disclosed at trial, the Nms court held that a
convicted person may challenge his conviction on the grounds of incompetency to stand trial
without a certificate from the Director of Prisons stating that there was probable cause to
believe that the person was mentally incompetent at the trial, as provided for in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4245. Rather, the convicted person may, on his own initiative, file a motion for a hearing
on the issue of incompetence undisclosed at trial under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976), which is a
collateral attack on the constitutionality of the conviction. 318 F.2d at 153.
17 S. 1722, supra note I, §§ 3611, 3617.
18 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, §§ 6121-27.
19 S. 1722, sura note 1, § 3611 (a); H.R. 6915, supra note 2, §§ 6121(a)-(b)(2). 18 U.S.C.
§ 4244.
20 Some commentators have raised quesitons about permitting the prosecutor or the court
to raise the competency issue for a variety of reasons. He may be charged with a misde-
meanor, or he may have no prior record. In either of these events, the possibility of probation
or short prison term may be more advantageous than a competency commitment. See Eizen-
stat, supra note 8, at 383-84; Incompeteny, supra note 8, at 466-68. In Carter v. United States,
283 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960), moreover, the court stated that, from the appearance of the
record before it, the appellant pleaded guilty to charges because basically the "appellant and
his former counsel concluded that ajail sentence. . . would be preferable to a mental exami-
nation..., with the possibility thereafter of an extended period of confinement. . . " Id. at
203.
On the other hand, the due process proscription against the conviction of an incompe-
tent defendant may impose a constitutional requirement that the court raise the issue of com-
petency if alerted to a competency question. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 181. The
concern over an unconstitutional conviction may also give a prosecutor standing to raise the
issue of a defendant's competency. See genral'y AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJEC ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Swadards Relating to the 1rosecution Function §§ 1.1(a)-(c)
(1970).
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The standard for the court to apply in S. 1722 in deciding whether
to order a competency hearing is one of reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.2' The reasonable
cause standard is similarly employed in section 6121 of H.R. 6915 for
ordering a screening examination 22 and in the present federal law. 23
The Senate bill does not require that the motion specifically state the
specific facts in support of such an order although the Senate report
assumes that this requirement exists by rule 47 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides that all motions must state the
grounds upon which they are made.24 Section 4244 of title 18 presently
requires that the initiating motion set forth the grounds for the belief
that the defendant may be incompetent. 25 H.R. 6915, on the other
hand, requires that the motion initiating the competency inquiry "allege
specific facts."'26
The House provision concerning the content of the motion trigger-
ing the procedures for a determination of mental competency seems
preferable. Even if the reasonable cause standard under the Senate ver-
sion would require factual grounds, the specific requirement in H.R.
6915 that the motion shall allege specific facts eliminates any doubt that
the contents of the motion must be factual. In addition, the decision to
commence the procedural steps leading toward an incompetency deter-
mination should be based on articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable
belief that the defendant may be mentally incompetent. 27 This is an
especially important decision-one which a defendant may oppose
when the prosecutor or the court initiates the competency inquiry over
21 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611(a).
22 H.R. 6915, su/pra note 2, § 6121(a).
23 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
24 The Senate Report states:
Under section 3611 (a) there is no specific requirement, as in 18 U.S.C. 4244, that the
motion set forth the grounds for the belief that the defendant is incompetent to stand
trial: however, this requirement is incorporated into the statute by Rule 47 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that all motions to the court must state
the grounds upon which they are made. Of course, pursuant to that rule, the motion
may be made orally, but grounds for the motion must still be stated.
S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1105 (footnotes omitted).
25 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
26 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121(b) (1).
27 Articulable facts are required under the fourth amendment in order to justify a finding
of probable cause for an arrest or search or of reasonable suspicion to stop a person short of an
arrest and to frisk. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The purpose behind such a requirement is to
insure that objective facts, rather than uncontrolled discretion, are the basis for a governmen-
tal intrusion into a person's privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment.
[Vol. 72
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the defendant's objection-and the decision should be based on objec-
tive facts so that the decision may be effectively reviewed. 28 Indeed,
H.R. 6915 requires that the court order initiating the competency deter-
mination include findings of fact supporting that order.29
A related issue concerns whether the court is obliged to initiate, on
its own motion, the procedure for a competency determination when the
court has some reason to believe the defendant is mentally ill. The Sen-
ate bill appears to require the court to order a competency hearing on its
own motion if reasonable cause exists.30 The House version provides
that the court may consider whether to commence the competency pro-
ceedings, 3' thus indicating discretion on the part of the court, but an-
other provision of H.R. 6915 suggests that the court must order the first
step in the competency determination if reasonable cause exists to be-
lieve that a defendant lacks competence. 32 No provision in title 18 con-
cerns the presence or absence of discretion by the court in deciding to
initiate competency proceedings. The constitutional basis underlying
the competency issue probably requires the court to commence the com-
petency inquiry whenever reasonable cause exists even in the absence of
a motion by the defense or the prosecution.3 3 The failure to inquire into
a defendant's competency may result in a conviction of an incompetent
defendant and therefore violate due process of law.3 4
If the court is required to initiate competency proceedings on its
own motion when reasonable cause exists to doubt the defendant's com-
petency, the threshold issue is when does reasonable cause exist. This
issue involves a case-by-case determination, for it is impossible to catalog
the facts that either singly or in combination establish reasonable cause.
If while presiding over pretrial proceedings or over the trial itself, the
court observes or hears about matters that indicate reasonable cause as
to a defendant's competency, it is then obliged to initiate the inquiry
into competency. When this obligation arises is presently the subject of
much litigation that develops on a case-by-case basis the type and quan-
tum of evidence necessary to trigger the court's order of a competency
28 In addition to preventing arbitrary determinations, the requirement of articulable facts
affords effective review of the trial court's determination. Id.
29 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121(a).
30 Sections 3611(a) provides that the court shall grant a motion for a competency hearing
or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe
that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.
S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611(a).
31 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121(b) (2).
32 Id. § 6121(a).
33 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 172-73; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. at 384-86.
34 Id.
1981] 439
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inquiry on the court's own motion.35
When May the Question of Competency Be Raised?
The Senate bill provides that an initiating motion may be made
"[a]t any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense
and prior to the sentencing of the defendant. '36 There is no provision
for questioning the competency of a defendant after conviction to deter-
mine whether the conviction constituted a denial of due process. In con-
trast, H.R. 6915 and title 18 of the present federal law each include one
provision that sets forth the procedures for determining competency
prior to trial or sentencing,37 and another that establishes the procedure
for determining competency after conviction when it was not raised
prior to trial or sentencing.38
Under H.R. 6915, the issue of a defendant's mental competency to
stand trial may be raised at any time before sentencing or during a post-
sentence hearing concerning revocation of parole or probation.39 De-
fense counsel, the attorney for the government, or the court may raise
the issue at any of these times. If, however, the question of a defendant's
incompetency is never raised prior to sentencing or during any revoca-
tion proceeding, section 6127 of H.R. 6915 provides for a procedure,
similar to that found in 18 U.S.C. § 4245, for determining, after the fact,
whether a defendant was mentally incompetent at the time of the trial.
If the Director of the Bureau of Prisons certifies that a defendant has
been examined by the Board of Examiners at a federal penal or correc-
tional institution and that there is probable cause to believe that such
defendant lacked competence at the time of trial, the district court in
which such defendant was convicted shall proceed with a determination
of competency at the time of trial.40
In addition, the district court may proceed with a postconviction
determination of competency to stand trial if the court has reason to
believe, apart from a certification from the Bureau of Prisons, that a
defendant was incompetent at the time of trial.4 ' Essential to either pro-
cedure for a postconviction determination of competency at the time of
trial is the proviso that the issue of competency was not raised and deter-
35 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847
(1979); Reed v. United States, 529 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 887 (1976); King
v. State, 581 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. App. 1979); Brady v. State, 584 S.W.2d 245 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1979); Johnson v. State, 583 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
36 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611(a).
37 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121; 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
38 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6127; 18 U.S.C. § 4245.
39 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121(c).
40 Id. §§ 6127(a)-(b).
41 Id. § 6127(b).
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mined before or during such trial.42 The procedures for determining
competency are essentially the same as those for the competency deter-
mination prior to trial.43 Although section 6127 of H.R. 6915 speaks in
terms of competency at the time of trial, presumably these provisions
would include a determination of competency at the time of a plea if a
guilty plea was the basis of conviction."
The House bill, by including a provision authorizing the court to
raise the issue of competency after conviction, goes beyond 18 U.S.C.
§ 4245 which, by its terms, permits a postconviction competency inquiry
only upon a certificate from the Bureau of Prisons.45 Although H.R.
6915 specifically limits this authorization to the court,46 neither the de-
fense counsel nor the attorney for the government are precluded from
presenting other reasons to the court. The House version in effect per-
mits the defense counsel or the prosecutor to raise the competency issue
after conviction by presenting to the court reasons to believe that a de-
fendant lacked competence at the time of trial.
The absence of any provision in S. 1722 for dealing postsentence
with incompetency undisclosed at trial does not necessarily foreclose
such a postconviction determination according to the Report of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee. The committee viewed the provisicns in rule
33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure47 as allowing a motion
for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, that is, evi-
dence of a defendant's incompetence at the time of trial.48
Notwithstanding the committee's hope that reasons indicating in-
competency at the time of trial will "most likely" be considered newly
discovered evidence warranting an inquiry into competency in a motion
4 2 Id. §§ 6127(a)-(b).
43 Id. §§ 6122-23, 6127(b).
44 If a person is competent to stand trial and therefore able to participate in a meaningful
way in his own defense, he should also be competent to waive the constitutional rights that
are part of a fair trial: right to trial by jury, right to present evidence, right to confront
witnesses against him, and the privilege against self-incrimination. See United States ex tel
McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339, 342 n.2-(3d Cir. 1975); Malinauskas v. United States, 505
F.2d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1006 (1973); People v. Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 335, 342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1976). In
Heral, the court held that "a finding of competency to stand trial necessarily involves a find-
ing that, with the advice and assistance of counsel, defendant is capable of waiving some or
all of his constitutional rights, whether by a plea of guilty or during the course of his trial."
Id.
45 18 U.S.C. § 4245 only allows postconviction challenges by means of a certification of
incompetency from the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.
46 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6127(b)(2).
47 "A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be
made only before or within two years after final judgment ... " FED. R. CRaI. P. 33.
48 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1106.
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for a new trial,49 problems remain in the relegation of this question to
the general postconviction remedy provisions in the federal code. First,
evidence of a defendant's probable incompetency at the time of trial
may not be considered newly discovered evidence necessitating a new
trial under rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Supreme Court of the United States has never ruled specifically on
whether mental incompetency may constitute newly discovered evi-
dence under rule 33. The opinions of the federal courts of appeals, in
setting forth the requirements for newly discovered evidence sufficient to
require a new trial, do not clarify whether mental incompetency will
meet the test for newly discovered evidence. Generally, for newly dis-
covered evidence to warrant a new trial, (1) it must not have been dis-
coverable pretrial by due diligence, (2) it must be material to the issue of
guilt or innocence and not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (3) it
must be such that its introduction would probably have produced a dif-
ferent result. 50 The one circuit to consider whether mental incompe-
tency constitutes newly discovered evidence held that it was not if the
mental incompetency could have been discovered pretrial by due dili-
gence of the defense counsel. 5 1
Whether mental incompetency may be considered newly discov-
ered evidence thus depends on the application of the traditional test for
newly discovered evidence. To the extent that the traditional test im-
posed requirements that do not pertain to mental incompetence-for
example, the requirement of materiality to guilt or innocence and the
due diligence requirement-it is not so "likely" that the issue of compe-
tency may be raised posttrial in a rule 33 motion.
Under federal caselaw interpreting section 2255 of title 28 of the
United States Code,52 a defendant may challenge a conviction on the
49 Id.
50 United States v. Zane, 507 F.2d 346, 347 (2d Cir. 1974),cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
51 United States v. Vowteras, 500 F.2d 1210, 1212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069
(1974). The District of Columbia Circuit, in considering a different type of newly discovered
evidence, has ruled that the due diligence requirement for newly discovered evidence should
not apply to newly discovered evidence that calls into question the constitutional validity of
the conviction. Marshall v. United States, 436 F.2d 155, 159 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1970). As a
conviction of a mentally incompetent defendant violates due process, the D.C. Circuit would
apparently allow a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence of incom-
petency without a showing of due diligence.
52 Section 2255 states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
[Vol. 72
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ground that he was incompetent at the time of trial or at the time of the
entry of a guilty plea.53 Before section 2255 may be used to inquire into
the competency issue, a showing is necessary that the trial court did not
consider and determine the issue at an evidentiary hearing under 18
U.S.C. § 4244;54 or, if it did, a showing that the trial court's finding was
clearly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence adduced at the
competency hearing is required.55 The motion under section 2255 must
in addition allege more than a bald and conclusory statement of incom-
petency. The motion must include specific factual allegations before the
court is obligated to grant a hearing under section 2255.56
The availability of section 2255 to review after conviction a defend-
ant's competency to stand trial is not preempted by the specific provi-
sions of 18 U.S.C. § 4245. Several circuits have ruled that a certificate
from the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is not a prerequisite for a
postconviction determination of the competency issue.57
53 See, e.g., Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956) (per curiam), vacating and remand-
ingforaheadng, 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Bryant v. United States, 468 F.2d 812,813 (8th
Cir. 1972); Hanson v. United States, 406 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1969); Floyd v. United
States, 365 F.2d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 1966); Nunley v. Taylor, 330 F.2d 611, 611-12 (10th Cir.
1964) (per curiam), overuling Nunley v. United States, 293 F.2d 651, 651-52 (10th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Cannon, 310 F.2d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. McNicholas, 298
F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 878 (1962).
54 Hanson v. United States, 406 F.2d at 202; Grill v. United States, 363 F.2d 32, 32 (5th
Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Bradley v. United States, 347 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1016, 385 U.S. 878 (1966). Under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, an evidentiary hearing is
triggered only by the submission of a psychiatric report which indicates a state of present
mental incompetency in the accused.
55 See Hanson v. United States, 406 F.2d at 202.
56 Eg., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 19 (1963); Nolan v. United States, 466 F.2d
522, 524 (10th Cir. 1972); Hartman v. United States, 310 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1962) (per
curiam); Hayes v. United States, 305 F.2d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 1962).
57 E.g., Nelms v. United States, 318 F.2d at 153; United States v. Cannon, 310 F.2d at
843-44; United States v. Thomas, 291 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1961); Simmons v. United
States, 253 F.2d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 1958); Gregori v. United States, 243 F.2d 48, 54-55 (5th
Cir. 1957).
In addition, an unsuccessful motion under section 2255 does not foreclose consideration
of a subsequent motion under section 2255. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 15-17,
where the court held that controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for
relief under § 2255 only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was
previously determined adversely to the applicant, (2) the prior determination was on the
merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subse-
quent application. Consideration of the merits of a new application for relief can be avoided
only if the government pleads that there has been an abuse of the remedy, such as when a
prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for relief at the time of his first application
in the hope of being granted two hearings rather than one. Id. at 17-18. In terms of succes-
sive applications with regard to mental incompetency, if, for example, the first application
merely contained a bald legal conclusion of incompetency and was therefore denied, a later
application alleging certain facts regarding incompetency could be allowed, since the first
application was not denied on the merits, but rather on the basis that the pleading was defi-
cient. Id. at 19.
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The federal caselaw concerning section 2255 and postconviction re-
view of competency at the time of trial appears to provide an adequate
remedy without the need for additional statutory authority. S. 1722,
however, makes no reference to section 2255. Since the Senate Judiciary
Committee contemplated the availability of section 2255 as a means for
a postconviction determination of competency,58 S. 1722 should explic-
itly recognize the section 2255 procedure. To the extent that postcon-
viction determination of competency is expressly authorized in H.R.
6915, the House version is preferable. Remedies and procedures that
are part of a statutory scheme ought to be included in the statute itself,
either by express language or by reference; the availability of any proce-
dure should not be hidden only to be discovered by diligent legal re-
search. 59
S. 1722 expressly 6° and H.R. 6915 impliedly provide that a deter-
mination of competency does not foreclose subsequent determinations.
The Senate Bill, like 18 U.S.C. § 4244, is not specific, but the same au-
thority for multiple determinations of competency may be implied from
the language that provides that a motion may be made at any time after
the commencement of a prosecution 6' and that the court shall order a
hearing to determine competency if there is reasonable cause to believe
a defendant presentl lacks competence. 62 Because the standard for com-
petency is the present ability to understand the nature of the proceed-
ings and to assist counsel in his defetise, a determination that a
defendant is presently competent one day does not necessarily mean
that such defendant will be competent the following week.63 If a de-
58 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1106.
59 The concern for easy access to all procedures that permit a determination of compe-
tency, either pretrial or postconviction, is especially important to prison inmates whose pris-
ons may lack the necessary library books or whose research skills are limited. This concern is
easily resolved during the recodification process by simply referring to related procedures in
the new statutory formulation or by incorporating such procedures into the recodification.
H.R. 6915 has chosen the latter method with respect to a postconviction determination of
competency (§ 6127), whereas S. 1722 has opted for neither alternative.
60 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121(c).
61 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611 (a); 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
62 Id.
63 Many mental disorders are not static. Conditions and symptoms change, and the effect
of the mental disorder on a defendant's competency may likewise change. The Supreme
Court, in talking about the relationship between mental disorder and incompetence to stand
trial, noted that "[e]ven when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a
trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the
accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. at 181. Mental retardation, however, may be a mental condition that does not change.
A determination of competency or incompetency may be valid for a substantial period of
time. See P. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 142-43 (1976).
Mental retardation is defined as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifest during the developmen-
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fendant's mental condition deteriorates during the period prior to trial
or sentencing, due process mandates a subsequent determination of
then existing competency.64 To the extent that H.R. 6915 grants spe-
cific authority for subsequent determinations of competency, it is prefer-
able to the implicit authority in the Senate version.
B. PROCEDURES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF MENTAL COMPETENCY
TO STAND TRIAL
A two-stage procedure determines mental competency to stand trial
after the court finds reasonable cause to believe a defendant lacks such
competence. The first stage involves the mental competence examina-
tion; the second consists of a hearing to determine competency.
Procedure for the Mental Competence Examination
If the court orders a competency hearing, the court may require,
prior to the hearing, a psychiatric examination of a defendant and a
psychiatric report to be filed with the court.6 5 This mental examination
is discretionary with the court under S. 1722 although the Report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee states that a psychiatric examination will
be routine in virtually all cases in which a hearing is ordered.66 Appar-
ently the committee foresaw situations where a determination of compe-
tency can be made without a psychiatric examination. Such situations
might include instances where a defendant is comatose or disoriented as
to time and place. Apart from these cases, a psychiatric examination
would always be warranted because the competency question involves a
determination of present competency.67
Unlike the Senate bill, H.R. 6915 provides for two types of mental
examinations. The first examination is a screening examination when-
tal period." AMERIcAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY
& CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 5 (Grossman ed. 1973). See also the definition
in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 14 (2d ed. 1968). The phrase "manifest during the developmental pe-
riod" implies the presence of a long-term, static disability. A real problem concerning retar-
dation and competency to stand trial, in fact, is that often courts treat the retarded offender
as if he was competent because of factors such as a general passive demeanor displayed in
court. See Compeltence to Plead, supra note 8, at 176.
64 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 181; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1966).
65 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611(b).
66 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1106.
67 Thus, a prior history of mental illness, made known to the court, would be an insuffi-
cient basis for a determination of present incompetency without a psychiatric examination.
ee United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973), and United States v. McEachern, 465
F.2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 (1972), in which the appellate courts recognized
that a psychiatric examination was required when the defendant merely stated before trial
that he had previous mental problems. Both Bass and McEachern, however, were decided
under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, where a psychiatric exam was clearly required, and was not discre-
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ever the court finds reasonable cause to believe a defendant lacks com-
petence.68 The purpose of the screening examination is to provide the
court with a basis for deciding whether a defendant is competent or
whether a more thorough mental competency examination is necessary
to determine competence. 69 The results of the screening examination
must be reported to the court within three days.70 If the court finds a
defendant competent after receiving the results of the screening exami-
nation, the case proceeds to trial unless the defendant objects and re-
quests a more thorough mental examination. 7' Such a request requires
the court to hold a hearing within forty-eight hours to determine
whether a more thorough examination of the defendant is necessary to
ascertain his competence. 72 The court must order such an examination
if it finds, after the screening examination or after a hearing on the issue
of a more thorough examination, that such an examination is necessary
to determine competence. 73
The bills also differ in defining who is competent to conduct a
mental competence examination. The psychiatric examination author-
ized by S. 1722 must be conducted by either a licensed or certified psy-
chiatrist or by a team consisting of a clinical psychologist and a medical
doctor.74 Thus, neither a clinical psychologist nor a medical doctor who
is not a psychiatrist may alone conduct the mental examination. Only a
psychiatrist may conduct such an examination alone. Each examiner
must be designated by the court. The court, however, in its discretion
may designate additional examiners. 75
The House bill differs from S. 1722 in its definition of the qualifica-
tionary, whenever there was reasonable cause to believe that a defendant might be presently
incompetent.
Even a prior determination of incompetency may be insufficient to support a finding of
present incompetency although, if the past determination was close enough in time, such
evidence may permit a new determination without a new psychiatric examination. Whether
such a prior determination of incompetency would be sufficient to dispense with a psychiatric
examination would then be a matter within the discretion of the court. Cf. United States v.
Bodey, 547 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977), and United States v. Cook,
418 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that the grant of a second psychiatric examination after
an initial finding of competency depends on such factors as the length of time between the
first exam and the request for another exam, and on the showing made for the second exam,
and that generally such a decision rests in the discretion of the trial court).
68 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121.
69 Id. § 6122(a). Another purpose of the screening examination, according to the House
Report, is to avoid frivolous motions and unnecessary, prolonged examinations. H.R. REP.
No. 96-1396 at 552.
70 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121(d).
71 Id. § 6122(b).
72 Id.
73 Id. § 6122(c).
74 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(b). See S. REP. No. 94-533 at 1106.
75 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(b).
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tions of the persons authorized to conduct the screening examination
and the more thorough mental competency examination under H.R.
6915. The House bill uses the term "a qualified health examiner," 76
which is defined as either (1) "a physician who has completed three
years of residency training in psychiatry in a program approved by the
American Medical Association," or (2) "a person who has received a
doctoral degree in a clinical program accredited by the American Psy-
chological Association and who has at least three years experience in the
treatment and diagnosis of serious mental diseases or defects."'77 The
Senate version, by way of comparison, imposes no training qualifications
beyond licensing or certification of a psychiatrist, medical doctor, or
clinical psychologist. 78 H.R. 6915 also differs from the Senate bill by
authorizing each of its two types of examinations to be conducted by a
single qualified health examiner.79 S. 1722, on the other hand, permits
only a psychiatrist to perform the examination alone.80
A further difference between the two bills concerns the disqualifica-
tion of certain examiners under the House bill. H.R. 6915 provides that
the thorough mental competency examination shall not be conducted
by a qualified examiner who is on the staff of an institution to which the
defendant may be sent if the defendant is found to lack competence.8'
No such limitation exists for the psychiatric examination under the Sen-
ate bill. Because there may be an institutional interest in the compe-
tency determination if the institution which employs the examiner may
receive the defendant as a patient,82 the House bill is preferable in its
elimination of any possible interest or bias by the examiner.
Commitment and Alternatives to Commitment for the
Mental Competence Examiation
The Senate bill authorizes the court to commit a defendant for ex-
amination as to mental competence. The commitment is to the Attor-
ney General for placement in a-suitable facility defined as a facility that
is suitable to provide care or treatment given the nature of the offense
and the characteristics of the defendant.83 Commitment is discretionary
76 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, §§ 6121(8), 6122(d)(1).
77 Id. § 6129(a)(2).
78 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(b).
79 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, §§ 6121(d), 6122(d)(1).
80 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(b).
81 H.R. 6915, sura note 2, § 6122(d)(1).
8 2 See Gray, The Inanivy Defense: Hitorical Development and Contempmoraq Relevance, 10 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 559, 579-82 (1972); Mental Health Law Project, supra note 8, at 622.
83 S. 1722, sura note 1, §§ 3617(a)(3), 3617(b).
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with the court, 84 but S. 1722 provides no guidelines for the exercise of
the court's discretion. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
notes that the court may order a mental examination without commit-
ment if the court believes that the defendant's examination can be con-
ducted on an outpatient basis. 85 Again, the Senate Report lists no
factors that the court should consider in deciding whether to commit or
to utilize an outpatient facility.
The House bill, on the other hand, does not permit commitment for
the initial screening examination. The screening examination may be
conducted at either the place of confinement if the defendant is detained
pretrial, or on an outpatient basis if the defendant is at liberty on bail.8 6
For the more thorough mental competency examination, H.R.
6915 authorizes commitment to a mental health facility but sets forth a
presumption against such commitment. In order to warrant a commit-
ment of a defendant, the court must conclude, supported by findings of
fact, that one of four conditions exists: (1) residence or confinement is
necessary for the examination; (2) residence or confinement is necessary
because the defendant has failed to appear for such examination or simi-
lar examinations in the past; (3) the defendant presents a substantial
probability of serious bodily injury to any person or substantial damage
to the property of others; or (4) the defendant is not otherwise released
from pretrial confinement.87 The House version thus does not automati-
cally penalize a defendant- by an involuntary commitment for examina-
tion when such defendant is not detained pretrial. His liberty is
respected, and the examination must take place on an outpatient basis
unless one of the conditions for commitment exists.88
Although no hearing for a determination of commitment for exami-
nation is explicitly authorized by H.R. 6915, a hearing requirement may
be implied from the necessity that such a commitment be supported by
findings of fact.89 Presumably a defendant's objection to an examina-
tion commitment would trigger a hearing on this limited issue. If not, a
defendant may attempt to gain his release from such a commitment by
84 Id. § 3617(b). This section states that the court "may" commit, rather than "shall"
commit.
85 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1107.
8 6
.H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6121(d).
87 Id. § 6122(d)(2).
88 Seegeneraly Marcey v. Harris, 400 F.2d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where the court ruled
that, on the request of the defendant, his commitment for purposes of a pretrial mental exam-
ination shall be limited to examination on an outpatient basis unless the court is advised by a
report from hospital authorities setting forth reasonable grounds that an inpatient commit-
ment is necessary to assure an effective examination; Golten, Role ofDefense Counselin the Crimi-
nal Commitment Process, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 385,390-92 (1972); Mental Health Law Project,
supra note 8, at 622-23.
89 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(d)(2).
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means of a writ of habeas corpus, which is specifically recognized as an
available remedy to challenge a commitment for treatment.90 The
House bill, however, does not explicitly include a challenge to a commit-
ment for a mental examination by writ of habeas corpus. This over-
sight, if not corrected in the legislative process, should be corrected by
court interpretation that would permit any commitment authorized by
H.R. 6915 to be challenged by a writ of habeas corpus. 91
Duration of the Mental Competence Examination
The Senate bill sets no time limits for an outpatient examination.
If, however, the court commits a defendant for a psychiatric examina-
tion, the commitment is limited to a reasonable period not to exceed
thirty days.92 A court could choose a shorter period of time as reason-
able. The director of the facility to which the defendant is committed
may apply for a reasonable extension but not more than an additional
fifteen days upon a showing of good cause that such an extension is nec-
essary to observe and evaluate the defendant. 93 Although an extension
order by the court is not explicitly authorized in S. 1722, presumably a
court has the power on its own motion to extend the commitment for a
period it deems reasonable, up to fifteen days, upon a showing of good
cause.
94
If a person is committed beyond the period authorized by S. 1722,
habeas corpus would be available to challenge such a commitment ac-
cording to the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee.95 No other
remedy for a commitment extended beyond the maximum period was
contemplated by the Senate Judiciary Commmittee. In fact, the Senate
Report states that the report of the psychiatric examination is not ren-
dered inadmissible at a competency hearing by reason of an unautho-
rized extension.96
90 "Nothing contained in this sub-chapter precludes a defendant who is committed for
treatment under this sub-chapter from establishing by writ of habeas corpus the defendant's
eligibility for release under this sub-chapter." Id. § 6129(b).
91 Although the commitment for treatment is different in purpose and duration from a
commitment for a mental examination, the House bill contemplates that each type of com-
mitment must comply with the requirements set forth. Any commitment that does not meet
these requirements is an unlawful commitment and should be subject to habeas corpus relief.
The failure of§ 6129(b) to explicitly include a challenge to a commitment examination may
be a drafting oversight that does not indicate a legislative intent to preclude a habeas corpus
challenge to such a commitment.
92 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(b).
93 Id.
94 Section 3617(b) assumes that the court will order an extension, but the bill does not
expressly authorize the court to issue such an order.
95 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1107.
96 Id.
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H.R. 6915, unlike S. 1722, does not impose any limit on the dura-
tion of a mental competency commitment. Instead, H.R. 6915 estab-
lishes time limits on the filing with the court of the report by the
qualified mental health examiner making the thorough mental exami-
nation. These time limits apply to examinations conducted on an out-
patient basis or at a mental health facility to which the defendant is
committed. 97 The time limits prescribed by H.R. 6915 are somewhat
shorter than those specified in S. 1722. The report must be filed with
the court within fifteen days although the court may extend this period
to the extent necessary to permit the transportation of a defendant to
and from a designated nonlocal facility to which he is committed. 9 In
addition, the court may extend the fifteen-day period on the motion of
any party if the court finds that specific additional examinations or pro-
cedures are necessary to a determination of the defendant's competence
and that an extension is required for such examinations or procedures. 99
The extension of time for the filing of the report with the court may not
exceed an additional thirty days. 100 Although no hearing on the exten-
sion is explicitly provided in H.R. 6915, such a hearing is apparently
contemplated in the language requiring a motion and court findings to
justify the extension.
The Senate bill requires a psychiatric report based upon the exami-
nation of the defendant to be filed with the court. 10 1 Unlike H.R. 6915,
and like title 18,102 there is no time limitation on the submission of the
report to the court. The report need not be filed within the authorized
period of commitment for an examination if commitment is ordered,
and the report need not be filed within any time period if the examina-
tion is conducted on an outpatient basis. The absence of any time limits
for submission of the psychiatric report may result in a substantial delay
prior to the competency determination. The delay may be significant if
the defendant is found to be competent as the delay may have speedy
trial implications. 10 3 If the defendant is found to be incompetent, the
97 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(2).
98 Id. § 6122(e)(2)(A).
99 Id. § 6122(e)(2)(B).
100 d.
101 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(c).
102 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
103 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme
Court announced a four-factor balancing test for determining when this constitutional right
to a speedy trial has been denied a defendant. These factors are: (1) the length of the delay
in the proceedings; (2) the reason for the delay (such as whether the defense or prosecution
caused the delay and, if the latter, the degree of good faith effort expended in bringing the
case to trial as soon as possible); (3) whether and when the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and (4) whether any actual prejudice to the defendant resulted from the delay
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delay may mean that a defendant is not provided necessary treatment
during the period of delay.
The House bill is preferable in its specification of time limits for
submission of the report. Even without explicit limits in S. 1722, how-
ever, the court should have the inherent power to prevent delays in the
filing of such reports with the court. The court's authority to orider the
due to destruction or staleness of evidence, oppressive pretrial incarceration, or thecreation of
excessive anxiety. Id. at 530-33. A finding that the right has been denied then requires dis-
missal of the indictment against the defendant. Id. at 522. However, the Court refused to
indicate a specified time period within which a trial must take place, preferring to leave such
rulemaking activity to the legislative branch of government. Id. at 523.
The Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), provides
for specific periods within which indictments must be filed and'trials must be held. Failure to
comply with the time limits prescribed by the Act results in the dismissal of the indictment
although discretion is given to the trial judge to dismiss the case with or without prejudice.
Id. § 3162(a). However, certain periods of delay are to be excluded in computing the time
limits, such as delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations to determine
the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant. Id. § 3161(h)(1) (A). Whether
the absence of time limits in S. 1722 for the submission of the psychiatric report afier the
examination might cause dismissal of the case is left unclear under the Speedy Trial Act,
although the exclusion of delays for examinations gives a strong implication from
§ 3161(h) (1) (A) that the absence of such limits in S. 1722 would not cause dismissal.
The Speedy Trial Act provides, however, that none of its provisions are to be interpreted
as a bar to a claim of denial of speedy trial as required by the sixth amendment. Id. § 3173.
Thus, even if a defendant cannot make out a violation of his statutory right, he may still
argue his constitutional claim. Courts have held that confinement in mental institutions for
purposes of determining competency to stand trial and for purposes of restoring competency
does not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment. E.g.,
United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 255-56 (6th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. United States, 333
F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir. 1964); Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964). Yet, federal courts have not specifically dealt with the issue
of whether psychiatric reports composed after the confinement examination must be timely
submitted to the court. The length of time in any particular case between the completion of
the examination and the submission of the report to the court must then be analyzed using
the Barker four-factor balancing test to determine if the right to a speedy trial has been denied
a defendant. In Barker, the Supreme Court regarded none of the four factors as determina-
tive; rather, they were balanced against one another in deciding whether the speedy trial
right has been denied. 407 U.S. at 533. Suppose, for example, that a defendant decides to
appeal his conviction on the basis of a deprivation of the speedy trial right, and he submits
the following facts for review: (1) the psychiatrist, due to his own carelessness, did not submit
his finding of competency until several months after the examination of the defendant; (2) the
defendant continually during the delay asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (3) during this
delay a key defense witness died thereby greatly prejudicing the defendant. A strong argu-
ment could be made that under the balancing test the right to speedy trial had been denied,
and that such a denial would result in reversal of the conviction and in dismissal of the
indictment. The delay in this situation, of course, is not properly the fault of either the de-
fense or the prosecution where the psychiatrist is really appointed by the court (as in S. 1722).
However, the Barker case noted, that the primary burden for bringing cases to trial is on the
prosecutor and the court. Id. at 529. Therefore, the court could be considered negligent in not
monitoring diligently the activities of the psychiatrist, and this negligence would certainly be
an important factor for tipping the balance in favor of the defendant's claim of deprivation of
speedy trial rights.
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filing of a report10 4 may implicitly empower the court to set a deadline
for submission of the report.
Requirement for the Report on the Mental Competence Examination
The psychiatric report filed with the court under S. 1722 must also
be provided to the counsel for the defendant examined and to the attor-
ney for the government. 105 By sending a copy of the report to defense
counsel, counsel may determine whether in his judgment it is appropri-
ate, useful, or harmful for his client to see the report.10 6 The House
version likewise requires that copies of the report of the mental compe-
tency examination be provided to the counsel for the defendant and to
the attorney for the government. ' 0 7
The contents of the report of the psychiatric examination submit-
ted pursuant to court order under S. 1722 must include the bases of the
opinions in addition to the opinions of the examiner. In particular, the
report must include (1) the defendant's history and present symptoms,
(2) a description of the psychological and medical tests employed and
their results, (3) the examiner's findings, and (4) the examiner's opinions
as to diagnosis, prognosis, and whether the person is presently suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to
the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences
of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. 08 S.
1722 thus requires the report to state the examiner's conclusion with
respect to the legal standard for incompetency.
The House bill similarly specifies the required contents of the
mental competency examination report. 10 9 There are no content re-
quirements, however, for the preliminary screening examination under
H.R. 6915.110 The more thorough mental examination report of H.R.
6915 must include essentially the same information and opinions re-
quired in S. 1722. The House bill, though, sets forth some additional
content requirements. For example, H.R. 6915 mandates that the re-
104 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611(b).
105 Id. § 3617(c). According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the report must be sent to
counsel for the defendant, rather than to the defendant himself, so that counsel may deter-
mine whether it would be appropriate or useful for the defendant to see the report. S. REP.
No. 96-553 at 1107 n.17.
106 Id.
107 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(2).
108 S. 1722, supra note 1, §§ 3617(1)-(3), 3617(4)(A); S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1107.
109 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, §§ 6122(A)-(F). This is the more thorough mental examina-
tion which follows the initial screening examination of § 6121.
110 Id. § 6121(d). This section stipulates merely that a screening exam shall be performed
by a qualified mental health examiner, and that the examiner shall report the results to the
court. The court shall then determine what the results indicate. Id. § 6122(a). See text ac-
companying notes 68-71 supra.
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port include (1) psychological and neurological test data, (2) the as-
sumptions of the diagnosticians in performing evaluations, and (3) all
medical records made in the course of the examination, together with
any minutes or videotape of any staff conference held in the course of
the examination."' These additional requirements provide the court
with more information relevant to the validity of the opinions contained
in the report.
The House bill also calls for an opinion by the examiner on a criti-
cal issue involved in the incompetency determination and commitment.
The report must include a prognosis for the immediate future, both with
and without treatment.11 2 This opinion is valuable to the court because
the likelihood of regaining competency is important to the disposition of
an incompetent offender.'13 Although this opinion may be called for
under S. 1722,"14 the language in H.R. 6915 is much more specific in
terms of the medical findings required. Whereas S. 1722 provides that
the report shall include the examiner's findings and opinions,"15 H.R.
6915 states that the report must contain the examiner's conclusions con-
cerning the mental and emotional functioning of the defendant, specify-
ing the basis for such conclusions and including the nature and severity
of any impairments as of the present time." 16
The House bill, unlike the Senate bill, does not require an opinion
in the report on whether the defendant is incompetent. Instead, H.R.
6915 provides that the report shall include such an opinion only if the
examiner feels such opinion to be within the examiner's expertise.' '7 To
the extent that a qualified mental health examiner considers the issue of
competency to be a legal rather than a medical issue, H.R. 6915 does
not require an opinion on the issue of competency. By not requiring an
opinion on the ultimate issue, by requiring more of the information on
which the medical opinions are based, and by requiring more specific
medical conclusions that are directly pertinent to the competency issue,
H.R. 6915 attempts to leave the determination of competency, a legal
issue, to the court, and to provide the court with sufficient information
upon which to make its determination." 8 The Senate bill, on the other
Ill Id. §§ 6122(e)(3)(B), 6122(e)(3)(E).
112 Id. § 6122(e)(3)(D).
113 Id. §§ 6123(b)(2), 6123(c)(2). See text accompanying notes 231-48 infra.
114 Under S. 1722,supra note 1, § 3617(c)(4), the examiner is required to give his opinion as
to prognosis, but there is no specification that there be two prognoses-one with treatment
and the other without treatment.
"15 Id. § 3617(c)(3)-(4).
116 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e) (3) (D).
117 Id. § 6122(e)(3)(F).
118 Often, psychiatrists and psychologists have no special training or experience in the legal
question of competency. See, e.g., Gunther v. United States, 215 F.2d 493, 496-97 (D.C. Cir.
1954); Leavy, The Mental Ill CriminalDefendant, 9 CRim. L BULL 197, 220-21 (1973); Mental
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hand, is not as demanding in the type of information that must be pro-
vided in the report to the court and is not as specific as to the nature.of
the medical conclusions that should be supplied to the court. The Sen-
ate bill instead relies more heavily on the examiner's opinion as to the
mental incompetence of a defendant. Both bills, however, represent an
improvement over existing federal law, 19 which has no content require-
ments for the psychiatric report, in their attempts to structure the type
of evidence that a court should have available in determining compe-
tency to stand trial.
Foh Amendment Problems and the Exclusion of Evidence Obtained During the
Mental Competency Examination
Like the provisions of title 18,120 S. 1722 21 and H.R. 6915122 pro-
hibit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant during the
course of a psychiatric examination when offered on the issue of guilt.
These exclusionary provisions are designed to avoid compelling a de-
fendant in a court-ordered psychiatric examination to incriminate him-
self.123 The defendant's compelled statements, 124 it is assumed, will not
Health Law Project, supra note 8, at 621-24. In Gunther, the court concluded that expert
psychiatric judgment is relevant on the question of competency to stand trial, but that it is
not controlling. "Resolution of this issue requires not only a clinical psychiatric judgment but
also a judgment based upon a knowledge of criminal trial proceedings that is peculiarly
within the competence of the trial judge." 215 F.2d at 497. See also United States v. Adams,
297 F. Supp. 596, 597-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), where, despite the report of a court-appointed
psychiatrist that indicated the defendant was a "paranoid schizophrenic" and, therefore, in-
competent to stand trial, the court maintained that a mentally ill person was not automati-
cally incompetent to stand trial.
The concern about relegating legal issues to psychiatrists led one circuit court to prohibit
psychiatrists from testifying in terms of the legal standard for insanity. Washington v. United
States, 390 F.2d 444, 455-57 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
119 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
120 Id. This section provides that no statement made by the accused in the course of any
examination into his sanity or mental competency "whether the examination shall be with or
without the consent of the accused, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the
issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding." Id.
121 S. 1722, .supra note 1, § 3617 (g). The provision reads that "[a] statement made by the
defendant during the course of a psychiatric examination . . . is not admissible as evidence
against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding." Id.
122 H.R. 6915, upra note 2, § 6122(e)(4). This provision reads as follows:
Any statement or conduct of the defendant occurring during the course of a mental
examination or during commitment for treatment . . . or any evidence derived from
such statement or conduct-
(A) is not admissible as evidence at any criminal trial of the defendant on the issue
of whether the defendant engaged in the conduct constituting the offense charged; and
(B) is admissible at trial on the issues of insanity or state of mind only if the defend-
ant initiates the introduction of such evidence.
Id.
123 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1109; Pizzi, supra note 8, at 43-49.
124 The defendant's statements are compelled in the sense that the court-ordered psychiat-
ric examination in essence requires the defendant to cooperate with the examining psychia-
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incriminate him if his statements are inadmissible on the merits of the
crime charged.
The Senate and House bills differ, however, in several respects.
First, H.R. 6915 extends the evidentiary prohibition to the defendant's
conduct as well as his statements. 25 Although the defendant's conduct
may be nontestimonial, and therefore not within the privilege of the
fifth amendment, 26 the inadmissibility of a defendant's conduct avoids
determinations concerning the testimonial nature of the conduct and
provides extra protection against an unforeseen use of the psychiatric
examination.
Another difference between the two bills lies in the scope of the
trist. A competency examination involves a psychiatric interview concerning the nature of
the charges against the defendant in order to provide a basis for an opinion on competency.
Competency requires an understanding of the nature of the charges and the ability to assist
counsel in his defense, therefore the examiner must ask the defendant about the crime
charged. If the defendant refuses to answer the examiner's questions, he does not comply
with the court order and subjects himself to the contempt sanction.
Where the defendant's counsel raises the competency issue, a question arises as to
whether the defendant is compelled to talk to the examining psychiatrist. Although a defend-
ant's motion for a competency determination may be viewed as a waiver of his right against
self-incrimination, there are persuasive reasons for rejecting this position. First, because a
waiver of the fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege must be knowing and intelligent,
see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a defendant's motion to determine his
competency indicates a possible lack of competency to waive the fifth amendment privilege as
well as to stand trial. Even if the defendant is considered competent to waive this right, his
decision to move for a competency determination should not be equated with a knowing and
intelligent waiver. Before ordering the competency examination, the court is not required to
inform the defendant of his self-incrimination privilege, and nothing suggests such a warning
is the regular practice in federal courts. Nor does the psychiatrist have much incentive to give
such a warning to the defendant. Second, to require a defendant to waive his fifth amend-
ment privilege as a condition of asserting his due process right to avoid a conviction while
incompetent may well impose an impermissible burden on the exercise of a statutory and
constitutional right to a competency determination. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the defense counsel may move for a competency determination without the defendant's par-
ticipation in the decision. Indeed, counsel for the defendant may have an ethical and consti-
tutional obligation to raise the competency issue over the defendant's objection. See note 20
supra for a discussion of the obligation to raise the competency question. For discussion of the
self-incrimination issue, see generaly Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Examiation? Privilege
Against Sef-Incrimination, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 498 (1965); Lefelt, Pretrial Examinations: Com-
pielld Cooperation andtheFth XhAmendment, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 431 (1972); Pizzi, supra note 8,
at 27-34. Note, Requiring a Ciminal Defendant to Submit to a Coverment Pychiatric Eamination.: An
Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARv. L. REV. 648 (1970).
125 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(4). The inclusion of conduct in the provision recog-
nizes the use of conduct as statements in the form of implied assertions. For example, conduct
feigning mental incompetency may be viewed as an implied assertion of guilt. Implied asser-
tions by conduct of a defendant would be admissible against him at trial, if not excluded by a
provision such as § 6122(e)(4) in H.R. 6915, because if intended as an assertion, it would be
an admission. FED. R. EvID. 801(a), 801(d)(2). If not intended as an assertion, it is not
hearsay and thus would be admissible except for a provision like § 6122(e)(4) in H.R. 6915.
126 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966); Lefelt, supra note 124, at
434-35.
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exclusionary provision. The House bill prohibits the use of a defend-
ant's statements or conduct regardless of who is the proponent of the
evidence. 127 The Senate bill, by comparison, excludes the use of such
evidence only when offered against the defendant. 128 There is no prohi-
bition against the defendant's use of this evidence if it is otherwise ad-
missible.
The House bill extends its exclusionary rule to statements or con-
duct of a defendant during a commitment for treatment to restore com-
petency. 129 The Senate version excludes only statements of a defendant
made during a psychiatric examination.130 Because commitment under
H.R. 6915 requires a report on the defendant's mental status, 3 1 com-
mitment for treatment serves much the same purpose as a mental exam-
ination prior to the incompetency commitment. The same policy
reasons that underlie the exclusion of statements made during the
precommitment examination certainly apply to statements made during
the commitment evaluation. Both involve compulsion of statements
whose use against the defendant implicates the privilege against self-
incrimination. The Senate bill similarly contemplates a mental evalua-
tion of a defendant committed for incompetency although the eviden-
tiary prohibition does not extend to a defendant's statements made
during such evaluation. For example, the court under the Senate bill is
to determine the committed defendant's competency and prognosis for
regaining competency after a reasonable period of time, not exceeding
four months, and at the end of a reasonable extension.' 3 2 The court
may receive at any time a certificate indicating restoration of compe-
tency from the director of the facility in which the defendant is hospital-
ized. 133 The reviews of a defendant's incompetency under S. 1722 in
essence require the hospital to provide treatment and a continuous eval-
uation of a defendant's mental state. As both treatment and diagnosis
likely may involve psychiatric examinations during commitment, any
statements by a defendant during such a commitment should be consid-
ered to be compelled, flowing from the involuntary nature of the com-
mitment, and thus should be inadmissible to the same extent as
statements made during the pretrial mental examination.
A third difference between the Senate and House bills concerns the
127 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(4)(A). See note 122 supra for a restatement of this
section.
128 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3 6 17(g). See note 121 supra.
129 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(4). See note 122 supra.
130 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 36 17(g). See note 121 supra.
131 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(e)(1)-(3). See text accompanying notes 262-65 infia, for
a discussion of this report.
132 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611 (d). See text accompanying notes 223-24 infra.
133 S. 1722, supra note 1, §§ 3611(e), 3617(e). See text accompanying note 225 infra.
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issues on which the defendant's statements or conduct will be inadmissi-
ble. The Senate bill, like title 18, excludes the defendant's statements
made during a psychiatric examination "on the issue of guilt in any
criminal proceeding."' 34 The House bill, however, renders such evi-
dence inadmissible when offered "on the issue of whether the defendant
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense charged."' 35 Both bills
thus do not exclude a defendant's statements during the competency
evaluation for all purposes. Only one purpose for which the evidence
could be relevant is precluded, so presumably the defendant's state-
ments might be offered on other issues if otherwise admissible.' 36 For
example, a defendant's statements offered on the issue of insanity, for
impeachment, or at sentencing arguably are used on issues other than
guilt. The effect of the difference in the wording of the excluded pur-
pose in both bills is not clear. The language in H.R. 6915 prohibiting
the use of a defendant's statements on the issue of whether he engaged in
conduct constituting a crime may limit admissibility only when such
evidence is offered on the issue of the defendant's commission of the actus
reus elements of a crime. This limitation would mean that the exclu-
sionary rule in the House bill is significantly narrower than the Senate
version that prohibits such evidence on the issue of guilt, since guilt en-
compasses both the mens rea and actus reus elements. On the other hand,
if the conduct constituting the crime is construed to include both the
ac/us reus, as well as the mental elements of an offense, then both the
Senate and House bills exclude the defendant's statements for the same
purpose.
Perhaps the major difference between the two bills on this point is
the addition of a specific section on admissibility of statements made
during the examination in H.R. 6915. Unlike S. 1722, the House bill
expressly provides that a defendant's statements or conduct during a
competency evaluation is admissible, notwithstanding the exclusionary
provision, on the issues of insanity or state of mind, but only if the de-
fendant initiates the introduction of such evidence.13 7 The effect of the
exclusionary and admissibility rules in H.R. 6915 is not entirely clear.
These provisions are ambiguous in several respects. First, the exclusion-
ary provision prohibits evidence of a defendant's statements or conduct
for one purpose only, 138 yet the admissibility section sets forth only two
134 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(g); 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
135 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e) (4).
136 The admissibility at trial of the defendant's statements for other purposes would de-
pend on their admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence. If admissible for one pur-
pose, the statements may be received in evidence as a general rule even though they are
inadmissible for another purpose. See FED. R. EVID. 105.
137 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(4)(B). See note 122 supra.
138 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(4)(A). See note 122 supra.
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admissible purposes. 139 One possible reading of the two provisions is
that evidence of a defendant's statements or conduct during competency
evaluations is inadmissible except for two purposes: insanity and mental
state. Another equally reasonable interpretation is that such evidence is
inadmissible for one purpose-on the issue of whether the defendant
engaged in criminal conduct-but that it is admissible for any other
relevant purpose. If the relevant purpose is on the issue of insanity or
mental state, however, then the introduction of such evidence is condi-
tioned on the defense initiating the introduction. If, however, such evi-
dence is relevant for any purpose other than insanity or mental state, its
admissibility is unconditional, and either the prosecutor or the defense
could first introduce that evidence. Analysis of the alternative construc-
tions of these provisions in the House bill will demonstrate, however,
that neither construction of the bill effectively safeguards a defendant's
fifth amendment privilege.
Both the Senate and House bills raise important questions concern-
ing their effectiveness in safeguarding a defendant's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Focusing first on the Senate bill, S.
1722 provides a use-type immunity in order to effectuate the fifth
amendment guarantee. Any compelled statements made by the defend-
ant may not be used against the defendant on the issue of guilt in any
criminal proceeding, and thus the defendant is not compelled to be a
witness against himself. Use immunity has been sanctioned by the
United States Supreme Court as a constitutional substitute for the right
to remain silent under the fifth amendment in other contexts. 140 The
problem in the incompetency area is whether the scope of immunity in
S. 1722 for statements made during a psychiatric examination is coex-
tensive with the scope of the fifth amendment privilege. In assessing the
scope of the S. 1722 immunity, 14 1 which is identical to the immunity
provided in the present federal incompetency provision, 142 it is impor-
tant to compare it with the immunity provision, 18 U.S.C. § 6002, that
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Kastlgar v. United States. 143 The
immunity statute that was challenged in Kastigar provided that "no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the [court] order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, ex-
cept a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise fail-
139 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(4)(B). See note 122 supra.
140 Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
141 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3 617(g). See note 121 supra.
142 18 U.S.C. § 4244. See note 120 supra.
143 406 U.S. 441.
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ing to comply with the order."' 44 The Supreme Court held that this
immunity was coextensive with the scope of the fifth amendment privi-
lege because the immunity statute "prohibits the prosecutorial authori-
ties from using the compelled testimony in any respect . .. 145
The exclusionary rule in S. 1722, by comparison, does not prohibit
the prosecutorial authorities from using the defendant's compelled state-
ments in any respect. Indeed, the Senate provision only prohibits the
use of the defendant's statements on the issue of guilt. Although exclud-
ing a defendant's statements on the issue of guilt might appear to pro-
hibit the use of such statements in any criminal proceeding and thus be
coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege, the issue of guilt lan-
guage does not necessarily exclude such statements for all purposes in a
criminal proceeding. For example, a defendant's statement offered to
impeach, or offered on the issue of insanity, or offered at sentencing are
arguably used on issues other than guilt. When used for such purposes,
however, a defendant's compelled statements would be used in such a
way that the defendant is compelled to be a witness against himself.
These uses in effect provide less protection than the total use immunity
approved by Kastigar;146 the immunity provided by S. 1722 thus falls
short of the protection necessary to achieve a scope coextensive with the
fifth amendment.
The sentencing example provides a striking and current illustration
of the limited use immunity in S. 1722 and its ineffectiveness in
safeguarding fifth amendment protections. The use at a sentencing
hearing of a defendant's statements to a psychiatrist during a court or-
dered mental examination may be tantamount to compelling a defend-
ant in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. In fact, this issue
is presently before the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith. 147 In that case
a defendant was ordered by the trial court to submit to a competency
examination. Although no statements made by the defendant were of-
fered at the defendant's murder trial, the examining psychiatrist testi-
fied for the state on the issue of capital punishment at the sentencing
hearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the use of the defendant's compelled statements on the issue of pun-
144 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976), quoted in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 448-49.
145 406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
146 Id.
147 Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 426 (1980). The
questions before the court are (1) whether the capital murder defendant was denied due proc-
ess by the state's use of psychiatric testimony at the punishment phase of his trial, and (2)
whether such a defendant must be advised, prior to the psychiatric examination, of his right
to terminate the interview, and right to be asserted by counsel in deciding whether to undergo
the examination. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 26, 1980).
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ishment violated his fifth amendment right. 148 In essence, the court
found the defendant in Estelle v. Smith was compelled to be a witness
against himself on the issue of punishment. The court indicated, how-
ever, that such use would be constitutionally sanctioned only if the de-
fendant waived, upon advice of counsel, his right to remain silent during
the examination. 149
Several problems arise in applying the waiver doctrine to com-
pelled mental competence examinations. First, because a waiver of the
fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege must be knowing and intel-
ligent, 150 a court's decision that there is reasonable cause to believe the
defendant is incompetent as the basis for the court-ordered examination
casts doubt on the competency of the defendant to knowingly and intel-
ligently waive his fifth amendment right. Second, to require the defend-
ant to waive his privilege against self-incrimination as a condition of
seeking a competency determination may well impose an impermissible
burden on the exercise of the constitutional right to be tried only while
competent. 151 On the other hand, if the defendant objects to a compe-
tency inquiry initiated by the prosecutor or the court, the waiver doc-
trine would effectively preclude a competency determination because
competent counsel would likely advise against a waiver. The only alter-
native for obtaining the information concerning the defendant's mental
competency would be to grant the defendant use immunity under 18
U.S.C. § 6002.
In view of the difficulties in establishing a valid waiver in the con-
text of compelled mental examinations, the Smith solution seems unreal-
istic. A total immunity against the use of a defendant's statements,
rather than a waiver doctrine, would be much more effective in safe-
guarding a defendant's right against self-incrimination. The immunity
approach would avoid the problems involved in the application of the
waiver doctrine in this context, and it would insure the cooperation of
defendants whose mental examination is critical to the competency de-
termination. In summary, if the statements are compelled by court or-
der, the fifth amendment requires the absolute prohibition of the use of
such statements against the defendant in any criminal proceeding. 152 As
sentencing is a part of a criminal proceeding, the exclusionary provision
of S. 1722 must insure that the defendant's statements "cannot lead to
the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness"' 153 in order to be coex-
148 Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d at 708.
149 Id. at 708-09.
150 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
151 See note 124 supra.
152 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441.
153 Id. at 453.
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tensive with the fifth amendment.
The impeachment example also illustrates the constitutional inade-
quacy of the limited evidentiary exclusion in S. 1722. The introduction
of a defendant's statements for impeachment purposes may be consid-
ered to be offered for a purpose other than to establish guilt. In fHanis v.
New York,1 54 the Supreme Court upheld the use of a defendant's state-
ment obtained in violation of Miranda 155 for impeachment purposes al-
though such statements were inadmissible to establish the defendant's
guilt in the prosecution's case in chief. The Court, in affirming the im-
peachment use of such statements, noted that the trial judge instructed
the jury that the statements "could be considered only in passing on
petitioner's credibility and not as evidence of guilt. ' 156 Although Harris
did not explicitly state that an impeachment use of evidence does not go
to the issue of guilt, the Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate that the
issues of guilt and credibility are different for purposes of determining
the admissibility of prior convictions.1 57 Whatever the value in distin-
guishing between issues of guilt and credibility in the evidence context,
it would seem that the use of a defendant's compelled statements to im-
peach him is, in essence, the use of his statements against him in a crimi-
nal proceeding, and thus a violation of his fifth amendment privilege.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, in NewJers v. Portash,'58 held that any use
of statements compelled pursuant to a use immunity statute is constitu-
tionally proscribed, even for impeachment purposes.
The insanity example further illustrates the definitional problem
inherent in S. 1722: What uses of a defendant's statements go to the
issue of guilt? Some lower federal courts, under the present federal law,
have allowed the use of a defendant's statements made during a compe-
tency examination on the insanity issue. The Third Circuit, however, in
reviewing such a use,' 59 has rejected the view that the insanity issue is
154 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
155 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
156 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 223. Cf. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980),
where the Court upheld the use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence to impeach his credibility.
157 FED. R. EvID. 404(a) excludes evidence of a person's character or a trait of his charac-
ter for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.
FED. R. EVID. 608,609, however, permit, subject to certain limitations, the proof of a person's
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness to show whether he is credible as a witness. For
example, evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction is inadmissible to prove that the
defendant committed the crime with which he is presently charged under rule 404(a), but it
may be admissible to impeach the defendant under rule 609 if he testifies and places his
credibility as a witness in issue.
158 440 U.S. 450 (1979). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where the Court
held that an involuntary confession, as opposed to one obtained in violation of Miranda, was
inadmissible for any purpose.
159 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975), where the court was
asked to consider if a defendant's statements made to a psychiatrist during a mental compe-
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distinct from the issue of guilt under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, and has stated
that when a psychiatrist testifies on the sanity issue, he is testifying
against the accused on the issue of guilt. 160 As the exclusionary provi-
sion in S. 1722 is identical to that in 18 U.S.C. § 4244, the problem of
determining what is an issue of guilt remains in S. 1722. A complete
prohibition on the use of a defendant's compelled statements avoids this
problem, and adequately safeguards the fifth amendment privilege.
The Senate bill may be constitutionally suspect in another respect.
Unlike the use immunity statute in Kastigar,161 the exclusionary provi-
sion in S. 1722, like that in 18 U.S.C. § 4244, does not by its terms pro-
hibit the use of evidence derived from a defendant's compelled
statements. In United States v. Malcolm,162 the Ninth Circuit permitted
the use of the fruits of a defendant's statements by allowing a psychia-
trist to give his opinion on sanity without disclosing the defendant's
statements. The court, in arriving at its decision, relied on the absence
of a derivative use prohibition in section 4244. The court stated that
"[i]f the examining psychiatrist does not testify to the statements of the
accused, his testimony is not foreclosed by section 4244."163 The failure
of S. 1722 and section 4244 to forbid such derivative evidence may mean
that the immunity provided for a defendant's compelled statements is
not coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege.
The exclusionary provision in the House bill is similarly inadequate
to protect a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The use of
a defendant's statements is not prohibited if offered at sentencing or to
impeach. 164 The House bill, unlike S. 1722, does exclude the derivative
use of a defendant's statements made during the psychiatric evaluation,
even if the defendant's statements are excluded.165
The provision in H.R. 6915 authorizing the introduction, on the
issues of insanity or mental state, of a defendant's statements or conduct
made during a court ordered mental evaluation does not present a fifth
amendment problem because admissibility is conditioned upon the
defendant first introducing such evidence. The introduction of his state-
tency exam were admissible at trial against the defendant on the issue of sanity. The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey in an unreported opinion had allowed the
introduction of such statements at the trial.
160 Id. at 1041-45. Cf Government of the Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393, 1397
(3d Cir. 1974), where the Court of Appeals held that sanity is an issue concerning guilt, and
therefore must be proven by the government beyond a reasonable doubt.
161 406 U.S. at 448-49, 453. See text accompanying notes 143-45 sufira.
162 475 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1973).
163 Id. at 426.
164 This conclusion depends on the second interpretation of the meaning of§ 6122(e) (4)(A)
and § 6122(e)(4)(B) of H.R. 6915. See text accompanying notes 138-39 supra for the two
possible interpretations.
165 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(4). See note 122 supra.
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ments or of psychiatric opinions based on his statements, therefore, con-
stitutes a waiver of his right to exclude his compelled statements or
derivative information. The waiver would, of course, then allow the
government to use such statements in rebuttal.
The House bill, however, does not go far enough. The admissibility
provision is limited to the use of a defendant's statements on the issues of
insanity and mental state.166 If this provision is read with the exclusion
provision so as to prohibit such evidence for any other purpose, 167 H.R.
6915 imposes an unnecessary bar to the admissibility of relevant evi-
dence. Because a concern for a defendant's right against self-incrimina-
tion is the basis underlying the inadmissibility rule, 168 a limitation is not
needed on the purposes for which evidence of a defendant's statements
may be offered so long as the defendant can waive his fifth amendment
right by initiating the introduction of such evidence. If, however, the
admissibility and exclusion provisions of H.R. 6915 are construed to per-
mit the introduction of a defendant's compelled statements for any pur-
pose except to prove that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct,169
then the condition on admissibility only applies to the use of such evi-
dence for two purposes-insanity and mental state. The use of a de-
fendant's statements or derivative opinions based on his statements
would then be admissible at a sentencing proceeding, for example, with-
out the requirement that the defendant first introduce such evidence.
Such a use would exceed the scope of immunity that constitutionally
supplants a defendant's fifth amendment privilege. 170
In order to safeguard adequately a defendant's right against self-
incrimination in the context of psychiatric evaluations during incompe-
tency proceedings, both S. 1722 and H.R. 6915 need revision. The ex-
clusion provision should prohibit the use against a defendant of his
statements or any information derived from his statements in all re-
spects. In addition, the defendant should be able to choose to use such
evidence, if otherwise admissible, and thus waive any fifth amendment
claim with respect to compelled statements.
The use of the competency examination as a means of developing
evidence for a possible insanity defense presents several problems apart
from the fifth amendment issue. 171 First, a defendant may not know
that his competency examination includes an evaluation of sanity at the
166 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(4)(B).
167 See text accompanying notes 138-39 supra for the two possible interpretations.
168 See note 123 & accompanying text supra.
169 See text accompanying notes 138-39 supra for the two possible interpretations of
§ 6122(e)(4)(A) and § 6122(e)(4)(B) of H.R. 6915.
170 See notes 146-53 & accompanying text supra.
171 See Pizzi, supra note 8, at 3843, for a full discussion of these problems in the federal
courts.
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time of the offense in addition to an evaluation of competency to stand
trial. The failure of trial courts to inform the defendant of the dual
purposes of the examination has led some appellate courts to impose a
notice requirement. 72 Second, a dual purpose examination is often of
longer duration than a competency evaluation by itself, and therefore
results in a longer deprivation of liberty for a defendant who is commit-
ted to a hospital for the examination.173 As few competency evaluations
result in insanity defenses, a longer examination and commitment is not
justified by necessity. 174 Finally, the dual purpose examination prima-
rily benefits the prosecutor by serving as a discovery device in anticipa-
tion of an insanity defense.' 75 Again, this is an unnecessary use of the
competency examination in view of the insanity examination authorized
by rule 12.2(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 176 Also, the
defendant may obtain a psychiatrist of his own choosing for an insanity
examination under the Criminal Justice Administration Act.177 In view
of these criticisms, it is important to ascertain whether the Senate and
House bills authorize or prohibit such examinations.
Neither the Senate bill nor the House bill specifically authorizes a
dual purpose examination when the court orders a mental examination
on competency. 178 By the same token, neither specifically prohibits a
simultaneous examination on sanity at the time of the competency ex-
amination. The reasonable construction of the provisions concerning
the court order for a competency evaluation and the requirements of the
examiner's report suggest that both bills contemplate only a single pur-
pose examination-to determine competency. The Senate bill, for ex-
ample, requires that a mental examination report include the
examiner's opinions concerning the defendant's competency.179 In addi-
172 See, e.g., United States v. Driscoll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968).
173 See Pizzi, supra note 8, at 41.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 40.
176 FED. R. GRIM. P. 12.2(a) mandates that, if a defendant is going to rely upon the in-
sanity defense, he must notify the government in writing of such an intention. Under FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12.2(c), then, the court is empowered, upon the government's motion, to "order the
defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination by a psychiatrist designated for this purpose
in the order of the court."
177 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1980). The specific provision whereby a defendant can obtain his
own psychiatrist is § 3006A(e)(1).
178 Although 18 U.S.C. § 4244 also does not explicitly authorize a dual purpose examina-
tion, federal district courts often include an order for an insanity examination in the order for
a competency examination. Such orders for dual purpose examinations have been upheld on
the basis of the inherent power of the court; any authority stemming from 18 U.S.C. § 4244
for such orders has been rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Jines, 536 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th
Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976); United States v. Wade, 489 F.2d 258, 259 (9th Cir.
1973); Pizzi, supra note 8, at 38-41.
179 S. 1722, supra note I, § 3617(c)(4)(A).
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tion, it provides for a separate psychiatric examination on the issue of
insanity, 180 and the report of an insanity examination must include
opinions concerning the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense
charged. 181 Two separate examinations are thus contemplated under S.
1722; the competency examination is not designed to serve both pur-
poses. Although the House bill includes no provision concerning the
determination of the existence of insanity at the time of the offense, the
competency provisions clearly state that the examination ordered is to
determine the competency of the defendant.182
A related evidentiary exclusion in S. 1722 again follows the existing
law in 18 U.S.C. § 4244. This provision states that "[a] finding by the
court that the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial shall not
prejudice the defendant in raising the issue of his insanity as a defense to
the offense charged, and shall not be admissible as evidence in a trial for
the offense charged."' 83 There is no like provision in the House bill.
This exclusion is consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence which
would treat the finding of present incompetency as hearsay 184 and as
irrelevant to the question of insanity at the time of the commission of
the offense and also irrelevant to the question of guilt or innocence.' 85
Hearing to Determine Competeny
Time Limits. There is no time limit within which the competency
hearing must be held under the Senate bill. The only time constraints
imposed by S. 1722 are those provided for the mental examination.' 8 6
Delays between the termination of the competency examination and the
filing of the report and between the receipt of the report and the hearing
are not limited by specific statutory time periods. In this respect, S.
1722 is similar to 18 U.S.C. § 4244.187
The House bill strictly circumscribes the time period within which
the comp'etency hearing may be held. In addition to the limit on the
180 Id. §§ 3612(a), 3617(c)(4)(B).
181 Id..§ 3617(c)(4)(B).
182 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(c).
183 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611(f).
184 See FED. R. EvID. 801(c). The testimony would be inadmissible as to the truth of the
asserted insanity.
185 A finding of incompetency would not have any tendency to make the existence of the
defendant's guilt or innocence more or less probable than it would be without such evidence.
See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. Likewise, a finding of present incompetency would have little or
no probative value on the issue of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense.
Incompetency relates to a different time than insanity, and the tests for incompetency and
insanity are quite different.
186 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(b).
187 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
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time for filling the psychiatric report with the court, 188 H.R. 6915 re-
quires that the competency hearing commence no later than ten days
after the receipt of the report unless the defendant requests an addi-
tional examination by a mental health examiner of the defendant's
choice. 189 Such a request requires the postponement of the hearing for
fifteen days and the mandatory appointment of the defendant's choice
of examiner. 190
Procedural Safeguards. At the competency hearing ordered pursuant
to the Senate bill, a defendant is entitled to a number of procedural due
process rights. The existing federal statute, by contrast, does not ex-
pressly include any hearing rights. 19 1 Included in the protections af-
forded a defendant in S. 1722 are the right to counsel at the hearing,
including appointed counsel, the opportunity to testify, to present evi-
dence, to subpoena witnesses, and to confront and crossexamine wit-
nesses. 19 2 The House bill provides for the same rights except for the
right to counsel. 19 3 The failure to include this right may not be impor-
tant if the defendant is entitled to counsel under the sixth and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution. The right to counsel, however,
does not necessarily exist for all criminal defendants. Misdemeanor de-
fendants who are not sentenced to a term of imprisonment do not have a
right to the assistance of counsel as a constitutional requirement. 194 But
as a misdemeanor defendant who is found incompetent to stand trial
may be committed involuntarily to a mental institution, such a commit-
ment hearing should afford the assistance of counsel as a matter of due
process.1 95 The failure of H.R. 6915 to explicitly provide for counsel at
188 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6122(e)(2).
189 Id. § 6123(a) (2).
190 Id. § 6123(a) (3).
191 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
192 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3617(d).
193 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6123(a)(4). This section provides that, at the hearing, the
defendant shall have the right to present evidence, subpoena witnesses, and cross-examine
adverse witnesses.
194 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
195 For an adult, involuntary commitment to a mental institution for an indefinite period
of time requires due process protection, such as a commitment hearing, regardless of whether
the person is an ordinary citizen or a person charged with a crime. Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 738. Furthermore, procedural due
process rights that attach to such a hearing not only include the opportunity to offer evidence
and to cross-examine adverse witnesses, but also include the right to be present with counsel.
See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967). The maximum period for which confine-
ment and treatment to regain competency may be ordered is eight months under H.R. 6915,
see text accompanying note 231 infta, therefore, because such a period is a definite period of
time, Addingion and Jackson may not necessarily require the same protections required for an
indefinite period. However, in the recent case of Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), the
Court held that a Nebraska statute which authorized the involuntary transfer of a prisoner to
[Vol. 72
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
the competency hearing is not explained in the Report of the House
Judiciary Committee. The right to counsel should not be dependent
upon whether it is constitutionally required, but rather it should be in-
cluded as a statutory right based upon the policy reason that a poten-
tially incompetent defendant ought not be left without the assistance of
counsel in an adversary proceeding.
Although both the Senate and House bills afford certain procedural
rights at the competency hearing, both follow the existing federal
caselaw in not providing for a jury determination of competency.' 96
The nature of the competency inquiry as a matter collateral to the adju-
dication of guilt or innocence and the nature of the commitment as ther-
apeutic rather than punitive do not demand a jury as a constitutional
requirement. 197 Nor do any special policy reasons appear that would
dictate a preference for jury rather than court determination of this is-
sue. Indeed, the interest in speedy resolution of this issue-for both
speedy trial considerations if the defendant is found to be competent
and for treatment considerations if the defendant is found incompe-
tent-would support a non-jury determination. Moreover, the compe-
tency determination involves questions of a medical-legal nature that
jurors are illsuited to decide.
Standard of Proof. The test for incompetency the court must apply in
a hearing under S. 1722 and H.R. 6915 is whether the defendant is pres-
ently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in
a mental institution for treatment without a hearing violated procedural due process and
should have provided a full adversarial hearing including the right to be present with counsel.
Under the statute in question, if at the expiration of the prison sentence the prisoner was still
mentally ill, civil commitment proceedings had to be instituted in order to continue the com-
mitment. 445 U.S. at 483-84. Therefore, the initial commitment of the prisoner constituted a
definite time period in the sense that it could not exceed the duration of the prison sentence
without separate civil proceedings commencing. After Vitek, then, a person merely charged
with a crime facing the definite commitment period of eight months under H.R. 6915 should
not be denied the right to counsel at the competency-commitment hearing outlined in § 6123.
See general(y Note, Fourteenth Amendment-Due Processfor tisoners in Commitment Proceedings, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 579 (1980).
196 See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249, 267 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1016,407 U.S. 909 (1972); Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 970 (1969); United States v. Huff, 409 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 857 (1969); United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 1966).
197 In Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961
(1958), 362 U.S. 943 (1960), 368 U.S. 992 (1962), modified, United States v. Brauner, 471 F.2d
969, 997 (1972), the D.C. Circuit stated that competency is a separate issue from the issue of
guilt or innocence, and, as such, is an appropriate question ono for the judge. "Evidence in
respect to this defined competency is not admissible before the jury, because it is not relevant
to any question which the jury has to decide." Id. at 730.
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his defense. 98 This test in essence adopts the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States 199 and included in title 18.200
The standard of proof for a determination that a defendant is in-
competent to stand trial is one of preponderance of the evidence in both
S. 1722201 and H.R. 6915.202 Although this standard differs from the
higher clear and convincing standard that is constitutionally required
for civil commitment under Addington v. Texas,203 the differences between
civil commitment and a competency determination justify such a differ-
ence in the burden of proof both for constitutional and policy reasons.
The constitutional concern with the standard of proof is to ensure,
as a matter of due process, that the factfinder achieves an acceptable
degree of confidence in the correctness of factual conclusions for a par-
ticular type of adjudication. 204 The standard thus serves to allocate the
risk of an erroneous decision between the litigants and to reflect the rela-
tive importance of the decision. 20 5 In considering what standard should
govern in a civil commitment proceeding, the Supreme Court in Adding-
ton v. Texas assessed the individual's interest in not being involuntarily
confined indefinitely and the state's interest in committing a person.
The Supreme Court found that civil commitment impacts significantly
on an individual's interest in freedom from detention and the stigma
that accompanies civil commitment. 20 6 These significant interests call
for proof more substantial than a preponderance in order to avoid the
risk of an erroneous civil commitment with its consequent injury to the
individual. 20 7 The state's interests in protecting the community and the
individual are not harmed to the same extent by an erroneous decision,
and thus the state should assume the risk of an erroneous decision by
198 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611 (d); H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6129(a)(1). The test in the
House bill is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability "to consult with counsel in
the case with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and otherwise to assist in the
defendant's own defense, and to possess a rational and factual understanding of the proceed-
ings against that defendant." Id.
199 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). The test outlined in Dusky must be whether the
defendant "'has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.' " Id.
200 18 U.S.C. § 4244. The standard set forth in the present law is whether the defendant
"may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand
the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense." Id.
201 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611(d). The present law is less specific and provides that the
judge is to make a "finding" with respect to evidence presented at the competency hearing in
determining the mental competency of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
202 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6123(b)(1).
203 441 U.S. 418.
204 Id. at 423 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
205 Id. at 423.
206 Id. at 425-26.
207 Id. at 426-27.
[Vol. 72
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
proof more substantial than beyond a preponderance of the evidence. 20
The factors that led the Court in Addington v. Texas to require a
standard higher than a preponderance do not exist in the competency
adjudication. First, unlike civil commitment, an incompetency commit-
ment is not an indefinite commitment. 20 9 It is a temporary commitment
that may not become indefinite without a civil commitment. 210 Hence,
the individual's interests in a competency commitment do not involve
the same degree of deprivation of liberty occasioned by civil commit-
ment. In addition, the competency adjudication in H.R. 6915 does not
208 Id. at 427.
209 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, where the court held that a person committed on
account of his incapacity to proceed to trial "cannot be held more than the reasonable period
of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain
that capacity in the foreseeable future." Id. at 738. The Court refused, however, to prescribe
"arbitrary time limits," preferring, instead, to leave such limits to the discretion of the states.
Id. See text accompanying notes 222-24, 242 infra for the limits set out in S. 1722 and H.R.
6915.
210 See notes 228, 247 infra for a description of civil commitment under S. 1722 and H.R.
6915. UnderAddington, once the individual faces the possibility of an indefinite civil commit-
ment, the clear and convincing standard of proof becomes applicable. 441 U.S. at 432-33.
Under the Texas civil statutes in Addington, a person could be committed to a mental
hospital for an "indefinite period" if (1) he had been under care in a mental hospital for a
temporary period of at least 60 days within 12 months of the filing of the petition for an
indefinite commitment; and (2) an indefinite commitment hearing was held at which the
court or jury found that he was mentally ill and required hospitalization for his own welfare
and protection or the protection of others. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-40 to -57
(Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1980-81). Discharge from indefinite commitment could only occur,
first, when the director of the mental hospital determined after examination that the person
no longer required hospitalization, in which case the director could discharge the person him-
self. Id. art. 5547-80(a) (Supp. 1980-81). Secondly, the patient "or his next friend on his
behalf" could petition the county court for a re-examination and a hearing to determine the
need for continued hospitalization, in which case a hearing would be held without a jury to
determine this need; and if the court found that the need for hospitalization had disappeared,
then the patient would be discharged. Id. art. 5547-82 (Vernon 1958). The judge was not
required to order a re-examination and hearing, however, if the petition was filed within one
year of the indefinite commitment order or within two years of the filing of a similar petition.
Id. art. 5547-82(g). Thus, the court was not specifically directed to conduct a re-evaluation
hearing at regular intervals after the order for indefinite commitment independent of the
filing of a discharge petition by the patient.
Many civil commitment statutes, however, now mandate that once a person has been
committed to a mental facility for an extended period of time (such as three months or six
months), a subsequent re-evaluation hearing is required at a certain time after the initial
order, such as six months, before further extended periods of commitment may be ordered.
Such hearings are not dependent on the filing of a patient's petition. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 91 1/2, §§ 3-800 to -813 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1-11 to -12
(1978); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, §§ 7304-05 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). If a second commitment is
then ordered, the process repeats itself so that after a designated time another hearing must be
held before a third period of commitment can begin. Id. Under these types of statutes, each
commitment period is "definite" in the sense that another period cannot begin until after a
hearing has been conducted and a new order entered. These periods, however, are "indefi-
nite" in the sense that a person can only be released from commitment when he meets the
standards for release, if ever.
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automatically call for commitment. Rather than requiring commitment
for treatment in all cases, like S. 1722,211 the House bill permits either
outpatient treatment or hospitalized commitment upon a finding of in-
competence. 212 The House bill requires a separate decision to commit a
defendant for treatment, and this determination is the subject of a sepa-
rate commitment hearing.213 Second, and more important, the interest
of a defendant in the competency proceeding is not always against a
determination of incompetency. A defendant often seeks a finding of
incompetency that is opposed by the government.2 14 On the other
hand, in some cases the court or the prosecutor raises the issue of compe-
tency,2 15 and the defendant opposes a finding of incompetency. Where
defendants' interests as a group are unclear or contradictory, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to assess the impact of an erroneous decision in
the abstract. Of course, it may be possible to provide for two different
standards of proof depending upon who initiates the competency pro-
ceeding. For example, the preponderance standard might be used when
the defendant moves to establish his incompetency. The state's interests
would not then be sufficient to require a greater standard than prepon-
derance of the evidence. 216 If, however, the court or the attorney for the
government attempts to have the defendant declared incompetent, the
interests of such a defendant would be much the same as those of the
civil commitment individual, and a standard of clear and convincing
proof might be constitutionally required under the reasoning of Adding-
ton v. Texas. 2 17
A third reason, however, suggests that a preponderance standard is
more appropriate and constitutional than the clear and convincing stan-
211 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611 (d). This section requires commitment and does not au-
thorize outpatient treatment for the incompetent defendant.
212 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(b).
213 Id. §§ 6123(b)(2), 6123(c)(2). See text accompanying notes 242-68 injra for a full discus-
sion of the separate commitment hearing in H.R. 6915.
214 Section 3611(a) of S. 1722 and § 6121(b)(1) of H.R. 6915 permit the defendant to raise
the competency issue. See notes 19-20 & accompaying text supra for a discussion of who may
raise the issue.
One District of Columbia study, in fact, found that from fiscal 1952 through fiscal 1963,
85.7% of the motions requesting pretrial mental examinations of the defendant for the compe-
tency inquiry were filed by the defense. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF CO-
LUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL
EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES 24 (1965), citedin Pizzi, supra note 8, at
22 nn. 10-11.
215 Section 3611(a) of S. 1722 and §§ 6121(b)(l)-(2) of H.R. 6915 also permit the govern-
ment attorney or the court to raise the competency issue. See notes 19-20 & accompanying
text supra.
216 In the view of the House Judiciary Committee, for example, it would be inappropriate
to require a higher standard than the preponderance of the evidence "as a protection for the
defendant when the defendant is making the motion." H.R. REP. No. 96-1396 at 554.
217 441 U.S. at 423-33.
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dard. A significant factor in imposing the higher standard in Addington
was the nature of the state interests in civil commitment. These interests
were considered insufficient to outweigh the individual interests that
were harmed by an erroneous commitment decision. In a competency
proceeding, including one in which the litigants are in the position simi-
lar to the litigants in civil commitment-the state is the moving party
and the defendant is opposing-the state's interest includes the constitu-
tional concern that an incompetent defendant not be convicted. 218 This
due process interest may be so important that the opposing defendant's
interests in liberty and in avoiding the stigma of commitment do not
outweigh the harm to the state and to the adversary system in convict-
ing an incompetent defendant so that an erroneous determination of
incompetence involves as much harm to the state as to the defendant.
In other words, in a competency proceeding the defendant may be asked
to share equally with the state the risk of error when the possible injury
to the defendant is not significantly greater than the possible harm to
the state. Thus, only proof of incompetency by a preponderance of the
evidence will be constitutionally required.219
II. DISPOSITIONS FOLLOWING THE COMPETENCY HEARING
If the court does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the trial of the case shall pro-
ceed.220 If, however, the court finds by a preponderance that a defend-
218 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 171-72; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. at 378.
219 In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 725, furthermore, the Court indicated that lesser
safeguards may be appropriate where the commitment is temporary-as in a competency
commitment under S. 1722 and H.R. 6915. Therefore, the clear and convincing standard of
proof under Addington is not necessarily a constitutional requirement for a competency hear-
ing. In addition, because the state interest in discovering incompetency is so crucial to due
process, and because the lower preponderance of the evidence standard would further that
interest more readily than the clear and convincing standard, the preponderance standard
appears to be the constitutionally-mandated standard. But see Pizzi, supra note 8, at 65-66,
where the commentator attacks the preponderance standard which is prescribed in S. 1722
and H.R. 6915. Any statutory provision which incorporates such a standard, for Pizzi, "mis-
conceives the responsibility of the trial court. It will permit the court to try a defendant even
if the court, after having heard the evidence, remains uncertain as to the defendant's compe-
tency." Id. at 66. Pizzi suggests, instead, that the court conduct and control a thorough
hearing into the issue of competency, without relying on adversarial procedures such as cross-
examination and burdens of proof, in order to assure itself of the competency of the defendant
before proceeding to trial. Id. at 63-64, 66.
220 H.R. 6915, upra note 2, § 6123(b)(1). Section 361 1(d) of S. 1722 does not specifically
state that the case shall proceed to trial upon such a finding. However, in § 3611(e) of S.
1722, it is stated that a defendant who has recovered his competency during his competency
commitment shall then have his "date for trial" set by the court. S. 1722, supra note 1,
§ 3611 (e). See note 226 & accompanying text in/ra. By implication, therefore, the court shall
likewise set a trial date if the defendant is found competent at the initial competency hearing.
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ant is incompetent to stand trial, the Senate and House versions
prescribe different alternatives.
A. DISPOSITION PROCEDURES UNDER THE SENATE BILL
The Senate bill mandates commitment of an incompetent defend-
ant to a mental hospital for treatment. 22' No alternative to commit-
ment is prescribed. Commitment of an incompetent defendant is
limited to a reasonable period, not to exceed four months, as is necessary
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the fore-
seeable future he will attain the capacity to stand trial.2 22 This duration
of the commitment is consistent with the requirements set forth by the
Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana.223 A reasonable extension, not to
exceed two months, is permitted if the court finds a substantial
probability that during such an extension he will regain the competency
to stand trial.2 24 At any time that a defendant's mental condition is so
improved that the trial may proceed, the director of the hospital must
file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court that ordered the
commitment. 225 The court shall then hold a hearing to determine the
defendant's competency to stand trial. If the court finds the defendant
to be competent by a preponderance of the evidence, the court must
order the release of the defendant from the hospital and set the case for
trial.2 2 6 In addition, the defendant must be released from the hospital
whenever the pending criminal charges are disposed of according to
law.
2 2 7
221 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 3611(d).
222 Id. § 3611(d)(1).
223 406 U.S. 715. See note 209 supra for the holding. The Court added, however, that if it
is determined during or at the end of the reasonable commitment period that there is no
substantial probability that the defendant will attain competency in the foreseeable future,
then state civil commitment procedures must be instituted, or the defendant must be released.
406 U.S. at 738. See note 228 infla for a description of the civil commitment process under S.
1722.
224 S. 1722, supra note l, § 3611 (d)(2) (A).
225 Id. § 3611 (e).
226 Id. At this later hearing, in contrast to the initital competency hearing, the court must
find that the preponderance of the evidence indicates competency instead of incompetency.
227 Id. § 3611(d)(2)(B). The present law is much less specific on the duration of confine-
ment and provides merely that "the court may commit the accused to the custody of the
Attorney General or his authorized representative, until the accused shall be mentally compe-
tent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law."
18 U.S.C. § 4246. However, the courts have interpreted this competency confinement as a
temporary one that may not become indefinite without a finding that the defendant's release
"will probably endanger the safety of the officers, the property, or other interests of the
United States" as provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 4247. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 469 F.2d
676, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th
Cir. 1969); Royal v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 176, 178 (W.D. Mo. 1959). See note 228 hn#ta for a
discussion of indefinite commitment under the present federal law.
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If a defendant is still incompetent to stand trial at the end of the
maximum commitment, the Senate bill, like the present federal law,
provides that the defendant is subject to procedures that may lead to
civil commitment by state authorities or by the federal government.2 28
Pending these procedures, the defendant may be detained at the hospi-
228 S. 1722, supra note 1, §§ 3611(d), 3161. Section 3616 governs the disposition of one who
is still determined to be mentally incompetent at the end of the four-month period or the two-
month extension. If the director of the facility in which the defendant is being treated certi-
fies that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of
which his release would create "a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person or
serious damage to property of another," and that arrangements for the commencement of
state civil commitment procedures are not available, then the director shall transmit the cer-
tificate to the court and the court shall hold a hearing to determine by clear and convincing
evidence if the defendant's release would, in fact, create the substantial risks outlined by the
director. Id. § 3616(a). The court may order that a psychiatric exam be conducted and that
a report be filed with the court prior to the hearing. Id. § 3616(b). The hearing is to incorpo-
rate all the procedural safeguards provided for the competency hearing in § 3611(d). Id.
§ 3616(c). See text accompanying note 192 supra. The clear and convincing standard of proof
is applied, as under Addington, because the court is asked to determine the dangerousness of
the defendant, not the competency, and because of the potential for an indefinite commit-
ment based on dangerousness. Once the finding of dangerousness is made by the court, the
Attorney General shall release the person to the state in which he was domiciled or was tried;
but if such state will not assume responsibility, the person is to be, in effect, civilly committed
for treatment in a suitable facility until such a state will assume responsibility or until his
release or conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical care will no longer create
the "substantial risks" which triggered the commitment. Id. § 3616(d). The director of the
facility is to communicate to the court when the person no longer presents the risks to persons
and property, and the court shall discharge the person or hold a hearing on its own- motion or
on the government's motion. Id. § 3616(e). At this hearing the level of proof changes, so that
the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that release or conditional release
would no longer create a substantial risk to persons or property before discharging the person.
Id. However, the person may always challenge the legality of his detention by a writ of
habeas corpus. Id. § 3617(h). Also, § 3617(1) provides that the person's counsel or legal
guardian may at any time during the hospitalization of the person file with the court a mo-
tion for a hearing to determine if discharge from the mental health facility is warranted,
although no such motion may be filed within 180 days of a court determination that contin-
ued hospitalization is required.
Present federal law also provides for a hearing to determine dangerousness although dan-
gerousness is defined in terms of endangering "the safety of the officers, the property, or other
interests of the United States;" and the hearing does not specifically provide the defendant
with counsel, nor allow him to testify, although "the court may in its discretion call any other
witnesses for the prisoner." 18 U.S.C. § 4247. Such a hearing is triggered when the director
of a facility to which a defendant has been committed because of incompetence to stand trial,
under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, certifies to the court that the defendant is dangerous as defined and
that suitable arrangements for his care and custody are not otherwise available. The court
must, upon receipt of the certificate, cause the defendant to be examined by a psychiatrist
designated by the court and one selected by the defendant prior to the hearing. See note 227
.rupra. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4247, the court is to determine if the dangerousness exists after
hearing the evidence (no level of proof is specified), and if the court finds the defendant
dangerous, the Attorney General shall commit the defendant for treatment until the defend-
ant no longer is dangerous, or until arrangements have been made for the care and custody of
the defendant in the state of his residence or until his competency is restored, whichever is
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tal to which he was committed. 229
No provision in the Senate bill, or in the present federal law, ad-
dresses the question of what happens to the criminal charges if at the
end of the maximum commitment the defendant is still incompetent to
stand trial. The holding injackson v. Indiana230 addressed only the con-
stitutional limitations on an incompetency commitment. 23 1  The
Supreme Court was asked to dismiss the charges against the petitioner
who the Court found would likely never be able to participate fully in a
trial.232 The Court declined to consider the issue, stating:
Dismissal of charges against an incompetent accused has usually been
thought to be justified on grounds not squarely presented here: particu-
larly, the Sixth-Fourteenth Amendment right to a speedy trial, or the de-
nial of due process inherent in holding pending charges indefinitely over
the head of one who will never have a chance to prove his innocence.
Jackson did not present the Sixth-Fourteenth Amendment issue to the
state courts. Nor did the highest state court rule on the due process issue, if
indeed it was presented to that court in precisely the above-described form.
We think ... that the Indiana courts should have the first opportunity to
determine these issues. 23 3
Several federal courts after Jackson have dismissed the criminal
charges against a defendant who was incompetent to stand trial. 234 In
United States v. Geelan,235 the Ninth Circuit relied on the sixth amend-
ment right to a speedy trial in dismissing the indictment. The court,
applying the test in Barker v. Wingo,236 found that the delay of over six
earliest. 18 U.S.C. § 4248. As with S. 1722, habeas corpus is provided in 18 U.S.C. § 4248 as
a method of challenging any commitment.
In construing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246-48, the Supreme Court held that it is appropriate for a
court to hold a "dangerousness" hearing under § 4247 for one committed because of incompe-
tency under § 4246, once it is determined by a director of a facility that the mental incompe-
tence seems more than temporary. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956).
The Court held, furthermore, that the possibility of indefinite commitment under § 4248,
based on the findings in § 4247, is constitutionally permissible even though there may be little
likelihood of recovery. Id. at 375. After Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, the duration of the
competency commitment under § 4246 has been strictly limited to such time as is necessary to
determine whether there is a substantial chance of the defendant attaining competency in the
foreseeable future. E.g, United States v. Wood, 469 F.2d at 676-77. If, however, chances are
slight or there is no improvement in the defendant's condition, "then he must be released or
granted a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247." Id. at 677. The § 4247 hearing would then
serve as the basis for the possible indefinite commitment under § 4248.
229 S. 1722, supra note I, § 3616(a). No time limit is prescribed for this detention pending
the completion of the civil commitment procedures, as described in note 228 supra.
230 406 U.S. 715.
231 See notes 209, 223 & accompanying text supra.
232 406 U.S. at 738-39.
233 Id. at 740 (footnotes omitted).
234 See, e.g., United States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pardue,
354 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Conn. 1973).
235 520 F.2d 585.
236 407 U.S. 514. See note 103 supra for a discussion of the balancing test in Barker.
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years, due to an incompetency commitment in a mental hospital re-
sulted in severe prejudice to his insanity defense and denied him his
right to a speedy trial.23 7 In United States v. Pardue,238 the court stated
that due to the defendant's incompetency detention of nearly three years
and the small likelihood of his restoration to competency, "[h]is right to
a speedy trial is now in jeopardy, and serious questions of due process
and cruel and unusual punishment are present. ' 239 The court then or-
dered the release of the defendant and dismissed the indictment without
specifying which of the constitutional concerns was determinative.
Jackson does not mandate dismissal of the indictment at the end of
the maximum treatment period so the charges pend against the incom-
petent defendant. Jackson and S. 1722 require only the initiation of civil
commitment proceedings or the release of such a defendant at the end of
the maximum incompetency commitment. 240 The indictment may
therefore hang over the defendant's head while civilly committed or af-
ter his release. The only limits on the duration of this status for a de-
fendant are the sixth amendment right to speedy trial and perhaps the
due process clause. Neither the Speedy Trial Act of 1974241 nor S. 1722
provide a statutory solution to this problem.
B. DISPOSITION PROCEDURES UNDER THE HOUSE BILL
Treatment Determination
The House bill is superior to the Senate version because commit-
ment does not automatically follow a court's finding under H.R. 6915
that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial. This determination re-
quires an immediate treatment hearing to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that the defendant can be restored to compe-
tence within the maximum period (eight months) for which treatment
may be ordered, and, if so, what treatment is most appropriate to effect
that restoration. 242 If the court determines there is no substantial
237 United States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d at 588-89.
238 354 F. Supp. 1377.
239 Id. at 1382. The court did not, however, specifically find that there was a speedy trial,
due process, or cruel and unusual punishment violation. Rather, the court seemed to base its
decision for releasing the defendant and dismissing the charges on the fact that the incompe-
tency commitment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48 had surpassed a "reasonable period of time"
especially since it was not foreseeable when he would be competent to stand trial, and because
there was no appropriate federal facility at which he could receive the care he needed. 354 F.
Supp. at 1381-82. See notes 227-28 supra for a discussion of procedure under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4244-48.
240 406 U.S. at 738; S. 1722, supra note 1, §§ 3611(d), 3616.
241 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Act specifically exempts delay due
to incompetency for purposes of determining violations of the Act in § 3161(h)(1)(A) and
§ 3161(h)(4). See note 103 supra for a brief discussion of the Act.
242 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6123(b)(2)(A)-(B).
1981]
LEO M. ROMERO [Vol. 72
probability that the defendant can be restored to competency, and the
defendant does not request treatment, the court must order the defend-
ant released and dismiss all charges except class A or B felonies.2 43 Un-
like S. 1722, the House bill sets forth procedures for disposing of some
criminal charges against an incompetent defendant. 244 If the charges
are not of the most serious grade, they will be dismissed. Only class A
and B felonies, the most serious and most severely punished, will pend,
but only until the delay before trial amounts to a sixth amendment
speedy trial violation or a fifth amendment due process violation. 245
The effect of the treatment hearing is to avoid commitment and
treatment of an incompetent defendant for whom treatment is un-
wanted and is inefficacious for purposes of restoring competency.246
Such a defendant is then immediately subject to procedures that may
lead to delivery of the defendant to appropriate state officials for possi-
ble commencement of civil commitment proceedings by the state.24 7 A
dismissal of the federal criminal charges by reason of the defendant's
incompetence may be delayed pending delivery of the defendant to state
authorities.248 If, therefore, a defendant regains competency to stand
trial pending such delivery, criminal proceedings may resume.249
If the court determines at the treatment hearing there is a substan-
tial probability of restoring the defendant's competence, the court must
243 Id. § 6123(c)(1). H.R. 6915 defines class A and B felonies for purposes of authorized
terms of imprisonment as follows: for a class A felony, one can be imprisoned "not more than
life;" for a class B felony "not more than 160 months." Id. § 3702. The House bill and the
House Report do not indicate when, if ever, such charges will be dismissed against a defend-
ant. Presumably, then, the charges could stand until the death of an incompetent defendant.
244 See notes 230-41 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of S. 1722 and the uncer-
tainty as to the dismissal of criminal charges after the maximum period for the incompetency
commitment.
245 See notes 103, 233-41 & accompanying text supra.
246 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1396 at 554-55.
247 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, §§ 6123(c)(1), 6125(a). Section 6125(a) of H.R. 6915 provides
that a person found incompetent with no substantial probability of improvement shall be
delivered to the appropriate state officials in the state of the person's domicile, or, if there is
no domicile, in the state in which the federal court sits for possible commencement of state
civil commitment procedures if the court determines "there is probable cause to believe that
such person is presently suffering from mental disease or defect as a result of which such
person's release would create a substantial likelihood of serious injury to any person or sub-
stantial damage to property of others." Id. § 6125(a), This section provides no alternate pro-
cedure should the states refuse custody of the person, and is, therefore, different in scope than
S. 1722 and the present law. See note 228 supra. According to the House Report, the House
Judiciary Committee rejected the continuation of the federal procedure for commitment of
those found incompetent to stand trial and also dangerous. H.R. REP. No. 96-1396 at 559.
The committee basically concluded that such a procedure was an unconstitutional extension
of federal power into an area traditionally left to the states, and, in the long run, could only
lead to heavier federal involvement in the care of the mentally ill. Id. at 559-61.
248 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6125(b).
249 Id.
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order treatment for the defendant. 250 The House bill, however, gives
the court discretion to avoid treatment, dismiss the charges, and subject
the defendant to the procedures for delivery to state officials for civil
commitment.25' The exercise of this discretion requires the court to find
that the defendant opposes treatment and that to require involuntary
treatment would be unduly oppressive in the light of five factors: the
probability that treatment will restore the defendant to competence, the
nature of the proposed treatment, the nature of the charges, any weak-
nesses in the government's case, and the probable sentence to be im-
posed if the defendant is convicted.2 52 The discretion to dismiss the
charges even when treatment may restore competency is a significant
power given to the court. Properly exercised, this discretion will permit
the court to dismiss criminal charges for which the maximum sentence is
one year or less, or those charges for which it is likely that upon convic-
tion the court will order probation or impose a sentence less than the
maximum time for treatment to restore competency. In essence, this
discretionary provision allows the court to avoid treatment for compe-
tency that may be more of an imposition on a defendant than serving a
sentence upon conviction. In addition, this discretionary power may
prevent the abuse of incompetency proceedings by the government. Al-
though the attorney for the government may initiate the competency
issue over the defendant's objection, 253 a determination of incompetency
and that it is treatable does not necessarily mean that a defendant may
be involuntarily committed or treated if the court finds that such treat-
ment will be unduly oppressive.254 In other words, the government can-
not under H.R. 6915 use a commitment for treatment of incompetency
as an alternative to criminal prosecution and conviction if the court
finds such an alternative to be unduly oppressive.
Commitment Determination
The decision to order treatment under H.R. 6915 requires the court
to specify the facility at which the defendant is to be treated.2 55 Signifi-
cantly, the order to treat does not automatically mean commitment to
the treatment facility. H.R. 6915 provides that the defendant to be
treated may not be required to reside in or be confined at the specified
facility unless the court makes specific findings of fact supporting one of
250 Id. § 6123(c)(2).
251 Id.
252 Id. § 6123(c)(2)(A)-(B).
253 Id. § 6121(b)(1).
254 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1396 at 554.
255 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(a).
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four conclusions indicating that confinement is necessary. 256 The four
conditions essential for commitment for treatment of an incompetent
defendant are: (1) Such residence or confinement is necessary for such
treatment; (2) Such residence or confinement is necessary because the
defendant has failed to appear for such treatment or similar treatment
in the past; (3) The defendant presents a substantial probability of seri-
ous bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property of
others; or (4) The defendant is not otherwise released from pretrial com-
mitment. 257
The commitment provisions of H.R. 6915 thus create a presump-
tion of treatment at a facility on an outpatient basis for defendants who
are able to make bail. The defendant has not been convicted of a crimi-
nal offense, so there is no reason to involuntarily commit a defendant
and deprive him of his liberty prior to trial absent a showing of medical
necessity, dangerousness, or likelihood of failure to appear for treat-
ment.258 In summary, the procedure to be followed after a finding of
incompetency requires a hearing at which the court must decide
whether to order treatment for the incompetent defendant. If treatment
is to be ordered, the court must then decide whether to commit the in-
competent person for treatment.2
59
Although the maximum period of treatment as an outpatient or
while confined is 240 days under H.R. 6915,260 no specific provision al-
lows the order for treatment to specify a shorter time period. The bill
provides only that the court make an appropriate order.261 This provi-
sion may contemplate a time limit in the order. But even without a
specified time period in the treatment order, a report to the court by the
person in charge of the facility in which the defendant is being treated
will automatically call for a redetermination of competency or the need
for additional treatment by the court.262 A report to the court is re-
quired 110 days after the first order of treatment;263 and if the court
256 Id. § 6124(b).
257 Id.
258 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1396 at 555.
259 Although no separate hearing is prescribed for this commitment determination, the
decision to commit presumably would be part of the treatment hearing authorized under
§ 6123(b)(2). See text accompanying note 231 smpra.
260 H.R. 6915, supira note 2, § 6123(c)(1)(B).
261 Id. § 6123(c)(2).
262 Id. § 6123(a)(1). This section reads as follows:
Upon the receipt of a report of the results of an examination ordered under Section
6122 (relating to mental competence examination) of this title, or of the results of treat-
ment ordered under Section 6124 (relating to treatment to restore incompetent defend-
ant) of this title, the court shall hold a hearing to determine competence.
Id.
263 Id. § 6124(e)(1)(A).
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finds the defendant still incompetent and orders continued treatment,264
a second report is required 230 days after the initial order.265 If the
court finds the defendant still to be incompetent, the court may order
only an additional ten days of treatment for the maximum period of
treatment is 240 days. At that time, the court shall order the defend-
ant's release and shall dismiss all charges against the defendant except
class A and B felonies. 266 In addition, the director of the facility must
report to the court whenever it appears that the defendant has been
restored to competency, through medication or otherwise, or the maxi-
mum benefit has been realized from the treatment.267 The report must
include a description of the treatment provided, any improvement in
the defendant's mental condition, any recommendation for future treat-
ment, any change in prognosis from previous reports, and the
probability that additional treatment will restore the defendant's com-
petence.268
C. RIGHT TO REFUSE CERTAIN TREATMENT
The House bill includes provisions imposing strict requirements on
the use of certain controversial treatment measures. The Senate bill
contains similar provisions, 269 but they will not be codified in title 18.
Instead, they are included in S. 1722 as conforming amendments to the
Public Health Service Act.2 70 The Senate version thus contemplates
that controversial treatment will be strictly regulated although the regu-
latory provisions are no longer included within S. 1722.271
The treatment provisions in H.R. 6915 require the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to prescribe rules applying to the use of
psychosurgery, electric shock treatment, and the protracted use of
psychotropic drugs. 272 Such regulations must provide for the right to
accept or refuse the above types of treatment;273 and in order to ensure
that the acceptance of such treatment is voluntary, the regulations must
264 Id. §§ 6123(a)(1), 6123(b)(2), 6123(c)(2).
265 Id. § 6124(e)(1) (A).
266 Id. § 6123(c)(1). See notes 243-45 & accompanying text supra.
267 Id. § 6124(e)(1) (B) (i)-(ii).
268 Id. § 6124(e)(2)-(3).
269 The text of these provisions is found in S. 1722,supra note 1, tit. VII, § 611. See S. 1437,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3616() (1977), a predecessor bill of S. 1722 that contained these provi-
sions in the proposed recodification of title 18. The text of this section is contained in S. REP.
No. 95-605, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
270 42 U.S.C. § 201 ct seq. (1976). These conforming amendments to provisions outside
title 18 of the Code lie designed to amend 42 U.S.C. § 242a (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
271 See S. REP. No. 96-553 at 1125 n.62.
272 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(d)(1)(A)-(B).
273 Id. § 6124(d)(1)(G)(i). The conforming amendments in the Senate version are identi-
cal. S. 1722, upra note 1.
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require the informed consent of the patient-defendant.2 74 If the incom-
274 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(d)(1)(C)(ii). In § 6124(d)(4) and in the Senate version
there is an exception to the consent requirement for emergency administrations of medica-
tion. See S. 1722, supra note 1. Additionally, the Senate amendments use the phrase "volun-
tary informed consent." Id.
A person's right to refuse certain treatments, as reflected in the Senate and House bills,
may be traced to the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Among the
historic liberties protected by the due process clause is "a right to be free from, and to obtain
judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 673 (1977). Lower federal courts specifically have held that a mental patient, in a non-
emergency situation, has the right to decide for himself whether to submit to serious and
potentially harmful medical treatment that accompanies the administration of antipsychotic
drugs, i.e., drugs used in treating psychoses, particularly schizophrenia. "Psychotropic"
drugs, as used in the House and Senate bills, include antipsychotics, but also refer to poten-
tially less harmful types of anti-depressant drugs. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (Ist
Cir. 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144-45 (D.NJ. 1978) (on motion for prelimi-
nary injunction). The problem of defining a true "emergency" situation that would necessi-
tate the forcible administration of the drugs has most recently been addressed in Rogers. In
examining the limits of a state's police power to protect persons from physical harm at the
hands of the mentally ill, the court of appeals rejected a lower court holding that a patient
may be forcibly medicated where a failure to do so would result in a substantial likelihood
(defined as "more likely than not") of physical harm to the patient, other patients, or to staff.
634 F.2d at 656-57. The Court of Appeals held:
[T]he district court should not attempt to fashion a single "more-likely-than-not" stan-
dard as a substitute for an individualized balancing of the varying interests of particular
patients in refusing antipsychotic medication against the equally varying interests of pa-
tients-and the state-in preventing violence. Because we recognize the legitimacy of
both of these interests, we conclude that neither should be allowed necessarily to override
the other in a blanket fashion. Instead, the court should leave this difficult, necessarily ad
hoc balancing to state physicians and limit its own role to designing procedures for ensur-
ing that the patients' interests in refusing antipsychotics are taken into consideration and
that antipsychotics are not forcibly administered absent a finding by a qualified physi-
cian that those interests are outweighed . . . and less restrictive alternatives are avail-
able.
Id.
The Rogers court also examined the permissible limits of a state's parent patriae power.
Under such an interest, as distinguished from a police interest in preventing violence, the
state seeks to provide care to those unable to care for themselves. The court held that, gener-
ally, ajudicial determination of incapacity to make treatment decisions must be made before
the state may rely on itsparenspatriae powers to forcibly administer medication. Id. at 657.
However, the court went on to hold that an emergency situation would not require such a
determination of incapacity before medication could be administered; and the court implied
that a situation where delay could result in serious deterioration of mental health would
constitute such an emergency. Id. at 659-60.
With respect to guardians of incapacitated patients, the court further held that it is not
constitutionally required that the state must seek out the guardian for his approval of all
treatment decisions. The court feared that a physician might be deterred from recom-
mending potentially beneficial drug treatment due to the need to seek guardian approval.
The court mandated that state actions must be taken, nevertheless, "with the aim of making
treatment decisions as the individual himself would were he competent to do so." Id. at 661.
To ensure compliance with this requirement, the court suggested that there might be some
procedure for a periodic review of a patient's treatment history by an independent physician.
Id. To the extent that both H.R. 6915 and S. 1722 imply that a guardian is to be in more or
less constant contact with the physician and his treatment plans, both bills appear to go
beyond the Rogers holding. See note 275 & accompanying text infra.
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petent defendant is incapable of giving informed consent by reason of
his mental condition, such treatment may be permitted only with the
permission of the defendant's guardian and with the permission of the
court after a hearing at which the defendant is represented by coun-
sel. 275 No procedure is provided, however, for determining whether the
defendant is capable of giving consent.
The House bill includes certain prerequisites for informed consent.
First, the consent to treatment must be written on a consent form pre-
scribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.27 6 Second, the
defendant-patient must be given an oral explanation of the treatment at
least twenty-four hours prior to signing the consent form.277 The con-
sent form and the oral explanation must inform the defendant of the
reason for the proposed treatment, the nature of the treatment, the like-
lihood of improvement with or without the treatment, the possible side
effects of the treatment, the possible alternative treatments, and the
right to refuse the treatment.278 The same information must be in-
cluded in the written consent form. Third, both the oral explanation
and the execution of the consent form shall be in the presence of at least
one witness who is not associated with the treatment facility or with the
proposed treatment. 279 However, this disinterested witness need not be
the defendant's attorney. Even more important, however, is the failure
to include in these requirements the assistance of counsel. 280 Although
H.R. 6915 requires that the defendant-patient understand the oral ex-
planation of the treatment prior to signing the consent form, there is no
way to ensure an informed consent without the advice of counsel.
The very nature of the treating physician recommending the pro-
posed treatment is inherently compulsive; and, if the defendant is con-
fined for treatment, the nature of the setting adds to the compulsive
275 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(d)(1)(C)(ii). The Senate version does not require a
court hearing and court permission for such treatment of a defendant incapable of giving
informed consent. All that is required for such treatment is the informed consent of a guard-
ian or of any person appointed to represent the interests of the committed person. S. 1722,
supra note 1.
276 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(d)(2)(A)(i).
277 Id. § 6124(d)(2)(A)Cii).
278 Id. § 6124(d)(2)(B)(i)-(vi). The Senate version prescribes the same contents in a written
consent form and an oral explanation at least 24 hours prior to the signing. S. 1722, supra
note 1.
279 H.R. 6915,sura note 2, § 6124(d)(3). The Senate version is less specific, providing only
that there be at least one "independent witness." S. 1722, supra note 1.
280 The absence of counsel at this stage likely would not constitute denial of the sixth
amendment right to counsel since this is not a critical pretrial stage at which the absence of
counsel might seriously affect the subsequent criminal trial. Ste, e.g., United States v. Ash,
413 U.S. 300 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967). The Senate version also does not provide for the requirement of counsel to
aid in any informed consent. S. 1722, Supra note 1.
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atmosphere. Similar compulsive pressures led the Supreme Court to
recognize the assistance of counsel in the custodial interrogation setting
in order to ensure the free exercise of a defendant's right against self-
incrimination.2 8 1 When a defendant has been found by a court to be
incompetent, the need for the assistance of counsel becomes even
greater. The defendant's mental state may mean that a true under-
standing of the proposed treatment is unlikely, or it may mean that the
defendant is more susceptible to the recommendation for such treatment
by his treating physician. In either case, consent would not be truly
informed. The disinterested witness may help ameliorate or counter the
compulsive pressures to give consent, but such a person's presence can-
not ensure a knowing and intelligent consent. The House bill only re-
quires the disinterested person's presence. No explicit provision allows
for consultation between the witness and the defendant. Moreover,
nothing requires that the witness act on behalf of the defendant, that the
witness be known to the defendant, or that the witness be selected by the
defendant.282 Nothing in the warning or the procedure would prevent
the defendant from believing that the witness may be associated with
the facility or with the person recommending the treatment. The de-
fendant will not likely look to the witness for advice or for support in the
event that the defendant desires to refuse such treatment.
In order to ensure a true informed consent, the defendant must
have available to him a person whom he can be assured is acting on his
behalf-a person whom he can trust. The defendant's attorney fills that
role by reason of the attorney's professional obligation and by reason of
the attorney's prior relationship with the defendant. Although it would
be preferable to require actual consultation between the defendant and
his attorney prior to signing any consent to treatment of such a contro-
versial nature, certainly at a minimum the oral and written explanation
of the proposed treatment should inform the defendant of his right to
consult with his attorney or any other person of his choosing.2 8 3 Only
by providing the right to consult with a person selected by the defend-
281 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
282 These deficiencies exist in the Senate version also. S. 1722, supra note 1.
283 Arguably, the right to counsel should also attach at this consent stage under a due
process analysis. The Supreme Court has recognized that when an individual may be sub-
jected to loss of liberty he is entitled to due process protections under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 42-43 (1976); Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976). Since the proposed medical treatments would, in effect,
subject the individual to further control by the government beyond the control already exer-
cised in keeping the individual physically confined in the mental facility, the treatments in-
volve further intrusion on his liberty. Thus, the right to due process protection should attach
at the consent stage. The question becomes, then, what process is due; specifically, the ques-
tion is whether the right to due process at the determination to impose these treatments in-
cludes the right to counsel. The Supreme Court in Mathews set forth a test for deciding what
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ant can the defendant's right to refuse treatment be truly and scrupu-
lously honored.
D. RESTORATION OF COMPETENCY WITH THE AID OF MEDICATION
OR DRUGS
The House bill provides that a defendant who is otherwise incom-
petent to stand trial may proceed to trial if the administration of a
psychotropic drug under medical supervision permits the defendant to
maintain competence. 2 4 However, even if the defendant maintains
competence because of medication, the court may require that the de-
fendant undergo treatment if the court finds that competence without
the aid of medication is a substantial probability with treatment.285 In
the case of drug-aided competency, the prescribing physician must in-
form the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor of the fact that the
procedural safeguards are required as a part of due process in different settings. According to
the Mathews court:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government'sinterest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
424 U.S. at 335.
Therefore, in balancing these factors, right to counsel should be required as a matter of
due process at this consent stage because (1) the private interest here involves a critical deci-
sion concerning whether to allow the government to interfere with an individual's mental
functions, if only temporarily; (2) there is a great risk that without counsel an uninformed
decision would be made because an already committed individual may be naturally confused
and may not understand that he has a right to refuse the treatments, see notes 281-82 &
accompanying text sufpa, and (3) although there is a government interest in seeing that an
individual regains competency through the use of certain treatments so that he may stand
trial, providing the right to counsel would not necessarily frustrate that interest, but rather
would serve to insure informed consent. Moreover, the cost of providing counsel would cer-
tainly be manageable since an indigent defendant would more than likely have a govern-
ment-appointed counsel before the incompetency commitment, and this counsel could
represent the defendant at the consent stage. Of couse, if a defendant was wealthy enough to
afford counsel for a defense against the initial criminal charge, the presence of private counsel
at this stage would not impose any fiscal burden on the government.
284 H.R. 6915, supa note 2, § 6 12 4(g)(1). The House committee cited Mental Health Law
Project, supa note 8, at 627, for the proposition that the trial of defendants made competent
through medication is generally preferable to prolonged incompetency commitments al-
though such a trial is not an ideal situation. H.R. REP. No. 96-1396 at 558. Neither S. 1722
nor the present statutory law expressly provides for trials where the defendant is made compe-
tent through medication.
285 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(g)(2). The House committee here cited to Mental
Health Law Project, sufra note 8, at 627, stating that if a defendant " 'has some chance of
being restored to competency to stand trial without ultimate reliance on medication (or with-
out heavy dosages) he should be entitled to a reasonable delay for treatment.' " H.R. REP.
No. 96-1396 at 558.
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defendant is appearing in court under the influence of medication, in-
cluding the type and dosage, and the possible effects of the medication
on the defendant's appearance, actions, and general demeanor.2 86. If the
defendant proceeds to trial under such medication, the defendant has
the right to have the court inform the jury both at the beginning of the
trial and in the jury instructions at the close of trial, about the defend-
ant's use of the medication, the nature of the medication, and the proba-
ble effects on the defendant's demeanor and participation in the trial.28 7
The decision as to whether the jury should be informed of the defend-
ant's medication is vested solely with the defendant.2 88 The defendant
may choose to inform the jury or not, depending on the defense's assess-
ment of the prejudicial nature of such information as compared to the
prejudicial effect of the defendant's appearance or behavior due to the
medication. 289 The prosecutor and the court cannot override the de-
fendant's assessment and decision by giving such an explanation to the
jury over the defendant's objection.290
E. LITIGATION OF CERTAIN ISSUES WHILE THE DEFENDANT IS
INCOMPETENT
The House bill includes a provision that permits defense counsel to
litigate certain issues even though his client has been declared incompe-
tent to stand trial.2 91 The Senate bill contains no similar provision. 292
The issues that may be disposed of on behalf of an incompetent defend-
286 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6 12 4 (g)(3).
287 Id. § 6 124(g)(4).
288 Id. This section provides that if the defendant proceeds to trial with the aid of medica-
tion, "the court, upon the motion of the defendant, shall provide to the jury, at the beginning
of the trial and in the charge to the jury, an explanation of such medication and the medica-
tion's probable effects on the defendant's demeanor and participation in the trial." Id.
289 See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960), where the Washing-
ton Supreme Court reversed the murder conviction of a defendant who had been given a
tranquilizer drug shortly before he took the witness stand. The drug enabled him to calmly
recite the details of the murder for which he was on trial. The court concluded that there was
a reasonable possibility that "his attitude, appearance, and demeanor, as observed by the
jury, have been substantially influenced or affected by circumstances over which he had no
real control." Id. at 768, 355 P.2d at 327.
290 The House committee cited Mental Health Law Project, supra note 8, at 627, for the
belief that " 'in order to preclude the introduction of inflammatory and prejudicial informa-
tion, the prosecution should not be able to introduce this [information concerning the defend-
ant's use of the drug] into evidence.' " H.R. REP. No. 96-1396 at 558.
291 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(f). This section provides that even though a defendant
is incompetent,
any defense motions which are susceptible to fair discrimination before trial and without
the personal participation of the defendant may be made. An adverse ruling on a mo-
tion so made shall be without prejudice to the defendant's right to raise new factual
evidence or considerations regarding the same matters in later proceedings in the case if
competence is regained.
Id.
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ant in H.R. 6915 are "any defense motions which are susceptible to fair
determination before trial and without the personal participation of the
defendant. ' 293 Examples of some motions that would appear to meet
the definition of this section include motions to dismiss on the grounds
that the indictment is insufficient, that the statute of limitations has run,
and that double jeopardy bars prosecution. 294 Critical to this section is
the determination by the defense counsel that the issue can be fairly
disposed of without the participation or assistance of the defendant.
This determination requires the exercise of discretion by counsel in the
first instance; whether the court must entertain such a motion is not
clear. The language of this section does not indicate whether the court
must hear the motion or whether the court may refuse to hear the mo-
tion in the exercise of its discretion. Both the absence of any language
about the court's role and the provision that any adverse ruling on such
a motion shall be without prejudice to a defendant's right to raise the
matter anew if competence is regained suggest that the court must enter-
tain the motion. Even if the court does have discretion, it should give
due deference to the determination of counsel as counsel is in the best
position to ascertain the fairness of any litigation without the participa-
tion of his client.
Even if the incompetent defendant's attorney errs in his determina-
tion that a particular motion is susceptible of a fair determination while
the defendant is incompetent, H.R. 6915 provides relief for a ruling
against the defendant. Once competence is regained, the defendant
may raise the issue again by presenting new evidence or considerations
regarding the motion. 295 By this provision the House bill insures that
any ruling on a motion does not deny to a defendant his right to partici-
pate in the proceedings if his involvement would bring additional mat-
ters to bear on the ruling.
In allowing a procedure by which certain issues may be litigated
while the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, H.R. 6915 recognizes
that competence may vary with respect to different proceedings in a
criminal case. Part of the definition of competence is that the defendant
be able to assist in his own defense.296 Some defenses, however, are
292 Nor is there such an express statutory provision in the present federal law, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4244-48.
293 H.R. 6915, sufra note 2, § 6124(f).
294 In Oregon, for example, these motions are specifically permitted despite the fact that
the defendant is unfit to proceed to trial. OR. REv. STAT. § 161.370(5) (1979). Other mo-
tions that would seem to fit the definition in § 6124(0 are motions to dismiss on the ground
that the statute is unconstitutional and motions to suppress evidence when a search warrant is
the subject of challenge.
295 H.R. 6915, supra note 2, § 6124(0.
296 Id. § 6129(a)(1).
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largely technical for which counsel does not need the assistance of his
client. For many of such defenses, the defendant's incompetency, to
stand trial on the merits is irrelevant. Also, an adverse ruling on such
defenses does not necessarily involve a denial of due process. 297 For ex-
ample, a denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague does not require the defendant's participation,
even if competent, and such a ruling is very different from the convic-
tion of an incompetent defendant. For those motions that potentially
involve the defendant's participation, for example, a motion to suppress
illegally seized evidence, any due process issue presented by reason of
the defendant's absence due to incompetence is obviated by permitting
the defendant to relitigate the defense once competence is regained.
The failure of S. 1722 to include a provision allowing the incompe-
tent defendant's counsel to litigate certain issues may impose unneces-
sary treatment and commitment on an incompetent defendant who may
never be brought to trial for legal reasons unrelated to his incompe-
tency. To the extent that H.R. 6915 permits the criminal charges to be
disposed of on legal grounds prior to trial, the issue of incompetency is
rendered irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
The Senate and House proposals for dealing with incompetency to
stand trial represent significant improvements over the existing federal
law. In addition to codifying federal caselaw that had developed and
expanded the statutory framework, the bills incorporate many provi-
sions that effect substantial reform in this area of the law. Among the
major reforms are provisions that permit outpatient mental competence
examinations, specify requirements for the contents of the report on the
examination, set forth detailed procedures for the disposition of the in-
competent defendant, and impose certain limitations on certain treat-
ment of an incompetent defendant. Notwithstanding the problems in
each bill that have been explored in this article, the proposals merit seri-
ous attention by the next Congress.
The House bill, the superior of the two bills, is an excellent starting
point for the next Congress in continuing the effort to reform the law
concerning incompetency to stand trial. Its provisions afford more expe-
ditious resolution of many issues in a competency inquiry than does the
Senate version. In addition, the House bill provides greater protection
to the defendant who may be incompetent to stand trial. The House
provisions for an initial screening examination and for the restoration of
297 See notes 9-11 & accompanying text .wpra for a discussion of the due process basis un-
derlying the requirement of competency to stand trial.
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competency with the aid of medication permit the court to expeditiously
process cases in which the competency question has been raised. The
dismissal of minor charges against an incompetent defendant for whom
there is little likelihood of regaining competency and the disposition of
cases on certain legal issues while the defendant is incompetent allow the
court to clear its docket of cases that likely never will be brought to trial.
These same provisions afford more safeguards to the defendant. Addi-
tional protections for the defendant in the House bill are included in
provisions that authorize outpatient treatment of the incompetent de-
fendant and that empower the court to discharge an incompetent de-
fendant for whom treatment would be oppressive. In summary, the
procedural advantages to both the court and the defendant in the House
bill commend it over the Senate version as the model for future reform
of the competence to stand trial provisions in the federal law.
